
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**Economic and Investment Outlook** Third Quarter 2024

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### **Economic Outlook**

Halfway through 2024, the US economy remains in expansionary territory despite trends moderating a bit over the last 12 months. While there has been some slowing in key metrics like retail sales, consumer spending and housing, overall YTD economic data continues to remain relatively resilient. GDP increased at a +1.6% annualized rate in Q1 (decelerating from +3.4% in Q4) and consensus estimates for Q2 currently point to +2.1%, while Atlanta's GDPNow estimate is still above at +2.7% (Exhibit 1).



Note: GDPNow is not an official GDP metric or estimate from the Atlanta Federal Reserve. Rather it is constructed by aggregating statistical model forecasts of 13 subcomponents that comprise GDP to provide an intra-quarter estimate. Historically, this figure has tended to overstate actual final GDP readings but is still directionally meaningful.


### Source: The Federal Reserve of Atlanta, 6/27/24

One key factor supporting the economy has been a robust labor market backdrop driving consumer spending. Consumer spending continues to increase (real retail sales data +0.4% m/m in May which is consistent with Q2 real consumer spending growth of +1.5%) and even though there are pockets of increased weakness, especially in lower income



brackets, the average buyer remains willing to spend, primarily on experiences and services. That said, consumer sentiment continues to weaken, dropping to an 8-month low in June and the bifurcated nature of the economy is showing up in the data with subprime customers (who make up ~30% of the US population and are defined as having a <660 credit score) exhibiting signs of financial strain with excess savings gone (Exhibit 2) and decelerating wage growth (3 month moving average of median nominal wage growth down from +6.3% in March 2023 to +4.7% in March 2024 with real wages declining even more due to inflation). Several companies are starting to respond to this weakness with thousands of everyday items seeing their first price cuts in years at Walmart, Target, Walgreens, etc., (although most goods remain priced above pre-pandemic levels). Overall, the consumer has been stronger for longer than most expected, but there are signs that the pressure is finally cracking underlying stability, especially within the middle/lowend income cohorts.





Note: Excess savings calculated as the accumulated difference in actual de-annualized personal savings and the trend implied by data for the 48 months leading up to the first month of the 2020 recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Source: San Francisco Federal Reserve, 5/8/24



In addition to resilient consumer spending and GDP growth, inflation has started to recede but remains elevated above the Federal Reserve's 2% target, in-line with our cautious viewpoint over the last few quarters. The May CPI report had encouraging signs on the surface with headline CPI of +3.3% and core +3.4% y/y; the core CPI only increased 0.2% m/m, which was the lowest since 2021. The topline diffusion index (based on the share of the consumer shopping-basket that's rising or falling by more than a specified amount - using a three-month moving average to smooth out the change) saw the largest decline since April 2020 and core services slowed to 0.2% m/m, a level not seen since September 2021. The June CPI report validated most of these trends with the headline -0.1% m/m and core CPI only +0.1% m/m. These trends are clearly positive for decelerating inflation (especially with Core CPI exshelter now ~2% for the past 6 months), but it is worth keeping in mind that housing inflation remains sticky at elevated levels, food inflation accelerated, and energy provided a key benefit to the reduction in May and June which could be unsustainable given volatility (Exhibit 3).


Exhibit 3: Flat M/M CPI Reading Mostly Due to Energy Prices Which Can Be Volatile



Source: Jefferies, 6/13/24

The Federal Reserve seemed to recognize these latter concerns, noting in early June that more progress on inflation will be needed to support rate cuts. While the FOMC meeting was hawkish at first glance with the committee now only forecasting 1 rate cut in 2024 (vs. 3 previously and 6-7 cuts expected just 6 months ago), it is important to note that the long run neutral rate (also known as "r star") moved from 2.6% to 2.8%. This can be viewed in a couple of different ways. First, this 2.8% is the highest neutral rate the Fed has penciled in since early 2019 and likely an admission that the last leg of inflation may be harder to tame than originally expected. This sounds bad on the surface for equities, but the bullish perspective on this change is that the Fed's long-term overall policy stance has become 20bps less restrictive, which could be positive for the economy assuming inflation remains stable around these levels. That said, the Fed Chair Jerome Powell seems very focused on not repeating the inflation pain of the 1970s and this bears monitoring as to date the resemblance is eerie and we are approaching an important period if history is going to repeat/rhyme (Exhibit 4).

### Exhibit 4: Federal Reserve Trying to Avoid 1970s Inflation Repeat




Source: Bloomberg, 6/27/24


This recent Fed policy shift is in harmony with our view on "higher for longer" rates continuing because wages have risen significantly over the past few years and should keep inflation above the Fed's 2% target,




partially due to structural reasons. We have seen recent evidence of this with May payrolls increasing at 272k and average hourly earnings +0.4% m/m (+4.1% y/y), both well ahead of expectations. While there was some labor weakness in April, it now seems like that was largely caused by the timing of Easter, and thus the labor market remains healthy, as of now. Small business optimism is still seeing some pressure, but seems relatively stable (Exhibit 5) with one of our portfolio companies Intuit reporting in late May that "small business cash reserves are down 8% compared to this time last year, but up over 16% compared to pre-COVID", and while there are some worrisome indicators in the job market (fewer job openings/unemployed workers, reduced internships and unemployment rate finally passing the 4% threshold – see Exhibit 6), the core fundamentals remain relatively healthy, especially versus expectations.









### Exhibit 6: Job Openings Per Unemployed Person and Internship Openings Declining


Note: Bloomberg internship data compares the number of internships from Handshake in the 12 months from June 2023-May 2024 with the prior 12-month period.

### Sources: Jefferies and Bloomberg, 6/16/24

Outside of the labor market, there are other contributors that are worth mentioning in terms of the economic growth equation so far in 2024. First, higher interest rates have not yet had as much of an impact on the broader economy compared to past hiking cycles primarily because of the "mortgage lock-in effect." This derives from the fact that 40% of US



homeowners do not have a mortgage, 95% of mortgages are 30-year fixed, and 63% of mortgages have rates below 4% (Exhibit 7). In addition to home equity increasing over the last few years and many corporations refinancing their debt at low levels, this has created a US economy that broadly has lower interest-rate sensitivity than in prior Fed rate hiking cycles.




### Exhibit 7: Mortgage Lock-In Effect Limiting Impact from Fed Policy

Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), 6/27/24

Second, direct government spending (which will be discussed in further depth below) continues to remain a key driver in Real GDP growth. Programs such as the CHIPS Act, Inflation Reduction Act and Infrastructure Act have provided strong demand tailwinds and because of the lagged impact of the funds being disbursed, have contributed more to Real GDP recently than they did when passed in 2020/2021 (Exhibit 8). This will be described in more detail but Exhibit 10 shows that this tailwind is unlikely to be going away with plenty of fiscal policy funds

still to be distributed and the US government unlikely to be held accountable for excess spending any time soon.


### Exhibit 8: Direct Government Spending Contributing More to Growth Than During COVID



Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve (FRED), 6/27/24

On the flip side of these short-term benefits to growth, longer term consequences are starting to rear their ugly head as US government interest costs just surpassed our national defense budget and Medicare (Exhibit 9). As we have discussed in prior economic outlooks, the unsustainable government budget deficit is becoming a serious problem in our view and we believe it will have more impactful consequences over the next few years if interest rates remain higher for longer as we predict.





## Exhibit 9: US Department of Treasury Outlays Show Interest Costs > National Defense and Medicare

What does all of this mean for our go-forward economic outlook? We are forecasting Real GDP growth of 1.7% in 2024 and initiating a 2025 Real GDP estimate of 1.4%, still reflecting some moderation that we expect to occur in the second half of the year and into 2025. We still believe we are in the midst of a period of "rolling industry recessions and recoveries" (a concept we have discussed in prior outlooks) that are impacting individual sectors at different times and therefore limiting an economy-wide recession or fast recovery from occurring in the nearterm. We expect inflation will remain above the Fed's 2% target for longer than the market expects, meaning interest rates will stay elevated and start to more forcefully impact economic growth and employment in the coming quarters. The market has priced in 2+ rate cuts in 2024, which is slightly more dovish than our expectations, as we still think there may only be 1 cut in 2024 as the Fed has recently telegraphed unless economic growth is worse than we anticipate, dragging down inflation. Our current forecast is that the Fed is likely to remain higher for longer with 1 rate cut this year as inflation continues to prove somewhat sticky. As a result, we are forecasting headline CPI to end 2024 around 3.2%

and 2025 at 2.5%, both ahead of consensus (3.1% and 2.4%, respectively).

Despite continued volatility, our perspective on bonds has not changed much. The 10-year Treasury sits at 4.40% and 30-year at 4.56% as of June 30. While the forward trajectory of Treasury yields remains uncertain, we continue to expect long-term rates to moderate in 2024 and 2025, consistent with our belief that the economy will slow. With the economy holding up better than our original expectation so far in 2024, we are slightly adjusting our 10-year and 30-year Treasury bond forecast upward from last quarter and expect them to end the year at 3.75% and 4.00%, and initiating 2025 estimates of 3.25% and 3.50%, respectively.

All-in, the US economy's resilience through early 2024 has been impressive and makes it hard to envision a large recession in the near term unless there is a black swan event. While many economic variables do seem to be improving, we continue closely monitoring consumer spending, unemployment, fiscal policy and the Federal Reserve, as we still expect some economic softening as we enter 2025. We are more bullish on the macroeconomic outlook than we were 12 months ago given recent data, but believe some caution is still warranted due to the lagged effect of elevated interest rates and our expectation of entering a period of below average, "muddling" growth over the next few years (excluding wild card events like geopolitics, 2024 election uncertainty, faster technology breakthroughs with Al, etc.).

### Longer Term

In the last several quarters, we have written short thought pieces regarding reshoring/China, Artificial Intelligence, the US labor situation, the federal deficit, and US consumer resiliency as long-term factors impacting macroeconomic trends. This quarter, we thought it was timely to cover fiscal policy, especially with the myriad of recent large government programs passed and the 2024 US election in November.

To lay the groundwork before jumping in, fiscal policy has always played a role in the US economy, but in recent years post-pandemic, there have been a series of stimulus and larger discretionary government

Source: Department of the Treasury, 5/14/24




investment programs passed to help support growth. The US federal government has routinely used government spending and taxes to help offset peaks and valleys of the business cycle, and while it is common for spending to increase in a recession, the magnitude of the fiscal expansion during/post-COVID has been outsized compared to history. According to the San Francisco Federal Reserve, the deficit's increase during the COVID period was larger than one would have expected based on history with an increase to 11% of GDP in 2020 versus 7% expected and a continuation at that 11% level in 2021 before resetting back to normal trend. This was driven by large discretionary programs such as the \$2 trillion Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) and the \$1.2 trillion Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA).

There definitely is a case to be made that these recent US fiscal programs have been exorbitant, and we may be experiencing some unintended consequences with sticky inflation and rising debt interest costs. Regarding inflation, some academic researchers have argued that US stimulus programs raised inflation by ~1-3% by the end of 2021 and core CPI increased >2% in the US vs. only ~1.5% in a group of OECD countries (Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK) on average. Back in 2021, some economists raised the alarm about the size of fiscal stimulus and inflation risks, but at the time the bias was towards putting more money into the economy rather than less, especially based on the lessons from the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 where economists argued we understimulated the economy. In addition, there are a laundry list of other consequences we continue to deal with from the rising fiscal spending, but the other one we would highlight (as we have in past outlook pieces) is the deficit and rapidly expanding debt service costs. With legislation like the IIJA, Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS Act being passed after initial pandemic stimulus (American Rescue Plan – ARP), government spending continues today, and outlays are still directly impacting the economy (Exhibit 10). We will not rehash the discussion from Exhibits 8 and 9 above, but the US deficit and interest expense continues to grow, and the bill will eventually come due at the pace politicians are going, especially based on their short-term incentives not being aligned to long-term US balance sheet financial health. Overall,

while it may feel like the large pandemic-based fiscal policies are long behind us, we are still feeling their consequences with monies still to be distributed and to impact the broader economy.

### Exhibit 10: Fiscal Policy Still Reverberating Around US Economy



Source: Raymond James, 5/16/24

Taking a more positive perspective, one could defend the fiscal actions as being necessary and adding key investment in areas the US has historically lagged like infrastructure, semiconductors, etc. In addition, while US core CPI has accelerated faster than some countries, nearly every country in the world experienced a massive rise in overall inflation

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over the last few years, which suggests that global forces like supply chain disruptions and geopolitical conflict were larger inflation factors than country-specific fiscal stimulus. For example, Sweden saw one of the highest headline inflation increases from Jan 2021-Mar 2023 (+20%), while their debt/GDP barely budged from 36% pre-COVID to a peak of 40% during the early stages of the pandemic (today it has fallen back to 29%). As another example, German debt/GDP went from 60% to 70% and is now at 65%, while their headline inflation increased only ~17% over the same period. These examples are very different from the fiscal response which occurred in the US, yet US domestic headline inflation increased only ~19% over the same period, implying it is not fully credible to only blame US fiscal stimulus for high inflation. Overall, while this viewpoint could acknowledge excessive fiscal policy raises concerns (especially in terms of private sector crowd-out and risk to the US dollar as a global reserve currency), it would argue that global supplyside forces have largely driven this inflation episode and thus fiscal policy was justified because of the huge benefit it had in supporting small businesses, jobs, poverty reduction (declined from ~12% in 2020 to ~8% in 2021), and public good improvements that drive long-term, more sustainable productivity and growth.

Conventional macroeconomic theory says that fiscal policy which increases the deficit can boost short-run economic growth. As we discussed, the US's post-pandemic fiscal policy was unusually expansionary, which helped speed up the domestic recovery, but potentially contributed to some unintended consequences like inflation as well. Over the next few years, we would expect the remnants of recent fiscal policies to continue to contribute to growth, but in a more muted way especially pending the outcome of the 2024 US Presidential Election and continued rising deficits/debt.

## **Economic Outlook**

Third Quarter 2024

Outlook	2021	2022	2023	2024E	2025E
Real GDP	5.7%	1.9%	2.5%	1.7%	1.4%
Inflation (Headline CPI) Year over Year (YoY) change	7.0%	6.5%	3.4%	3.2%	2.5%
Operating Earnings (S&P 500 Index)	43.6%	7.3%	-1.2%	6.8%	10.5%
Annualhousing starts (in thousands)	1,600	1,553	1,420	1,400	1,500
Capex (Gross private domestic investment, fixed investment- non- residential)	7.4%	5.3%	4.5%	1.0%	0.5%
U.S. auto sales, domestically produced vehicles (in millions)	10.0	10.6	12.6	14.5	14.0
10-year Treasury (yearend)	1.51%	3.87%	3.88%	3.75%	3.25%
30-year Treasury (yearend)	1.90%	3.96%	4.03%	4.00%	3.50%

Source: 2024 and 2025 data estimates are Geneva estimates. Historical data, Bloomberg data and U.S. Federal Reserve data asof 6/30/2024

### **Investment Outlook**

"Bull Markets don't die by old age, but rather are killed by the Federal Reserve," as the adage suggests. There is speculation that the current bull market is approaching its twilight, given the robust performance of large-cap indices. If we start from the COVID-induced nadir in March 2020, the bull market is over four years old, aligning with the historical average lifespan of bull markets (3.80 years). Yet, from the October 2022 low, it stands at nearly 1.75 years, marking it as relatively nascent. Inflation is on the decline, catalyzed by some economic slowing, with the June Consumer Price Index (CPI) turning negative on a month over month basis for the first time since the COVID-19 pandemic, prompting the Fed to contemplate progressing with rate reductions. With unemployment at 4.1%, significantly below the long-term average of 5.7% since 1948, and potential rate cuts on the horizon, the market does not seem poised for a substantial correction.

Nevertheless, the large-cap stocks, often dubbed the 'Magnificent 7' have propelled this narrowly focused market, driving the Russell 3000 Growth up 20% year-to-date and the S&P 500 by 15%, compared to Russell mid and small-cap growth indices, which have risen by 4.5% and 6% respectively. The large-cap cohort could face some downward pressure as the investment landscape begins to change. Last quarter, we noted that the performance and valuation disparity between large and small/mid-caps had reached historic levels. Following the recent market reactions to the latest CPI figures, we observed potential precursors of a reversal, with small-caps outperforming large-caps by over 5% in a single day-the largest such gap since October 10, 2008 (the only day with this type of spread since 1979). Moreover, on a day when the S&P 500 fell by 2% due to inflation news, nearly 400 stocks advanced, leading the equal-weighted S&P 500 index to outperform its market-cap-weighted counterpart by over 200 basis points, marking the seventh largest divergence on record. This broadening of performance is a positive indicator, suggesting the overall economy has greater chances to reach a soft-landing, as opposed to only relying on AI for its continued ascent. Considering the impressive year-to-date performance of the S&P 500 now trading at a 21x earnings multiple—which, though elevated, has been sustained for some time-compared to the S&P 400



(mid-cap) and S&P 600 (small-cap) trading at multiples of 15x and 14x respectively, reinforces our thoughts that we could be in the early stages of a market rotation. Our projection for the S&P 500, with earnings of \$240 for 2024 and \$265 for 2025 and applying a 21x multiple, suggests a valuation of 5,303 over the next 12 months, representing ~3% downside from 6/30 levels. As we asserted last quarter, high-quality small-to-mid-cap equities currently offer attractive value compared to their more renowned large-cap counterparts, tend to benefit when rates are falling and have shown recent demand for such securities under the right conditions. This attractive setup could translate into small/SMID equity outperformance as an asset class as we look out over the next few years.





Exhibit 1: 2024 and 2025 S&P 500 EPS Estimates Holding Steady

Source: Strategas, 6/4/24





### Exhibit 2: Earnings Expectations are Bifurcated Between Magnificent 7 Stocks and the Rest

\*Note: Magnificent 7 includes Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Apple, Meta, Microsoft, Nvidia and Tesla.

### Source: Piper Sandler Cornerstone Macro, 6/2/24

### Small-Cap Growth Commentary

For the quarter ended June 30, 2024, the Geneva Small-Cap Growth strategy composite returned -1.01% (gross of fees, -1.14% net of fees) versus -2.92% for the Russell 2000<sup>®</sup> Growth Index, outperforming by 1.91% (gross of fees, 1.78% net of fees). Factor headwinds were mixed this quarter and didn't provide a meaningful tailwind or headwind to performance. Within the entire US equity universe, high quality stocks (those rated B+ or better) outperformed low quality stocks (those rated B or worse) by 1.83%. Within the Russell 2000 Growth Index, the lowest ROE, highest debt-to-cap and lowest P/E companies all outperformed, which was a headwind to performance, but the lowest beta companies outperformed, which offset some of these headwinds.


Contributing to relative performance at the industry level were technology, health care and industrials; these industries contributed 1.52%, 0.73% and 0.67%, respectively. At the stock level, the greatest contributors to performance were Onto Innovation, Globus Medical and Exponent; these stocks contributed 0.93%, 0.51%, and 0.45%, respectively.

- Onto Innovation (ONTO) is a leader in the development and manufacturing of process control equipment and software for semiconductor manufacturers. The stock outperformed behind a solid Q1 report that included revenue and EPS above expectations, while guidance for Q2 results and 2024 revenue also were ahead of prior expectations. The advanced packaging area remains a key source of strength for ONTO as demand for their process control equipment from AI-related applications is robust. At the same time, they think trends from the power semiconductor and advanced nodes areas should improve throughout 2024, with better trends expected for 2025. The end market demand environment, when combined with ONTO's innovation strategy and margin improvement initiatives, appears to be providing good visibility into continued strong performance into 2025. While valuation has expanded significantly in recent periods, we remain optimistic regarding the near-term trend and positive on the long-term growth opportunity for ONTO.
- Globus Medical, Inc. (GMED) is a medical device company focused on the design, development, and commercialization of products that promote healing in patients with musculoskeletal disorders, offering innovative spinal fusion products and robotic technologies. The stock was up over 20% following its Q1 earnings report in early May as investors became increasingly comfortable about the NuVasive deal integration and the company's ability to drive cross-sell as management noted extremely strong inbound interest from competitive sales reps. The company launched five new products in the quarter and plans a record level of product launches in the coming months, which should help Globus sustain market share gains and return to an industry-leading margin profile over the longer term. supported by ramping revenue volumes and acquisition cost synergies. Despite the earnings-driven rally and continued strength in the stock through the quarter, valuation is still reasonable, making risk/reward attractive at current levels.
- Exponent Inc. (EXPO) is a niche engineering and scientific consulting firm with multidisciplinary teams of engineers, scientists, physicians, and other experts helping solve complex



problems facing companies and communities. The stock was up nearly 20% following its Q1 earnings report in late April as management noted that demand improved through the quarter, leading them to raise full year guidance. While there is still some macro driven choppiness and uncertainty in end markets like consumer electronics, the company has taken a conservative approach with guidance and management believes that market drivers around safety, health and the environment remain firmly in place and customers will continue to face challenges as they innovate and therefore continue to seek Exponent's expertise, which should enable the company to achieve HSD-LDD organic revenue growth and margin expansion over the longer term.





Source: Bloomberg, 6/16/24




Exhibit 4: NVIDIA Accounts for 1/3 of Overall S&P 500 Return YTD

Detracting from relative performance at the industry level were financials, consumer staples and telecommunications; these industries detracted 1.03%, 0.42% and 0.36%, respectively. At the stock level, the greatest detractors from performance were Kinsale Capital Group, DoubleVerify Holdings and Trex Company; these stocks detracted 1.26%, 0.96% and 0.80%, respectively.

Kinsale Capital (KNSL) is a leading insurance carrier in the Excess and Surplus (E&S) industry, predominantly underwriting in the small and medium-sized business segments. The company had a mixed quarter with premium growth decelerating and coming in below expectations with operating earnings slightly worse than anticipated as well. The company has discussed growth moderating as the property insurance market has been in disarray for the last 12-18 months, and we are starting to see both growth and consensus expectations embed these new moderated levels. Even at these new levels the company continues to grow at an attractive pace while generating strong returns and this is a trend that we expect to continue. We monitor the insurance market backdrop given the


Source: Strategas, 6/26/24




favorable conditions over the last few years but remain confident in Kinsale's differentiated approach driving leadership through the cycle.

- DoubleVerify (DV) is a leading digital advertising verification • software provider that helps advertisers ensure their ads are delivered in a brand-safe environment, viewable to real people and fraud-free. The company has historically been a strong performer, growing revenues 25%+ over the last several years with 30% EBITDA margins. Unfortunately, DV reported a weak Q1 where they reduced full-year financial guidance below expectations. The stock was down ~40% due to this FY24 revenue guidance reduction (now expecting 17% growth vs. 22% prior) which was a surprise to investors, including ourselves. The company called out weaker than expected spending patterns among six select large CPG/retail advertisers as 80% of the reduction and product mix shift as the other 20% where lower priced social/international business grew faster than premium priced Activation products. Management acknowledged they don't have great visibility into when these large CPG customers spend will return which raised some concerns on the outlook over the next 6-12 months. Overall, a very disappointing quarter, especially after management implied they were conservative in their original guidance several months ago. That said, DV still believes in 20%+ revenue growth long-term but it will take at least a couple guarters to reset the business and for management to regain credibility. While we still think there are attractive attributes to DV as a high-quality company, we think the stock is in the penalty box until we start to see better trends, with management needing to prove themselves again and help investors get comfortable there isn't something more nefarious going on.
- Trex Company (TREX) is a leading manufacturer of composite decking and railing products. Despite a strong earnings report, the stock sold off on concerns about end market demand potentially deteriorating. Fundamentals in the quarter were strong, with revenue and EBITDA beating investor expectations, Q2 guidance coming in above and importantly seeing sell through (end market demand for contractors) up mid-single

digits. The only part of the announcement that wasn't positive was that despite the better first half of the year, guidance for the full year was unchanged, implying a mid-single digit decline in the second half of the year. In our opinion, this prudently bakes in a fair degree of conservatism given the selling season was only starting out and consumer spending has been uneven. Despite the underperformance, the long-term opportunity to take share from wood and TREX's leading position within the composite decking category remain intact in our view.





Note: Performance breadth is defined as Russell 1000 Equalweight Index – S&P 500 performance with lower trend line indicative of "narrowing" performance.


### Source: FactSet, 6/28/24

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


### Exhibit 6: Number of Rate Cuts Priced into Market by Year End Has Been Unchanged Since April

Exhibit 7: Small-Caps Still Look Cheap Relative to Large-Caps Using P/E Multiples



Source: Strategas, 6/27/24



### Exhibit 8: Small Caps Outperform 6-12 Months after First Cut

Note: Data spans small vs. large cap relative returns in the 1/3/6/12 months before and after the first Fed rate cut since 1974.

Source: Bank of America US Equity & Quant Strategy, 6/10/24

### **Mid-Cap Growth Commentary**

For the quarter ended June 30, 2024, the Geneva Mid-Cap Growth strategy composite returned -5.26% (gross of fees, -5.38% net of fees) versus -3.21% for the Russell Midcap® Growth Index, underperforming by 2.05% (gross of fees, 2.17% net of fees). Factor headwinds were mixed this quarter and didn't provide a meaningful tailwind or headwind to performance. Within the entire US equity universe, high quality stocks (those rated B+ or better) outperformed low quality stocks (those rated B or worse) by 1.83%. Within the Russell Midcap Growth Index, factor headwinds were more meaningful; specifically, the outperformance of nonearners, lower ROE and high debt-to-cap companies. Offsetting some of this was the outperformance of low beta stocks.

Contributing to relative performance at the industry level were consumer staples, technology and basic materials these industries contributed 0.42%, 0.26% and 0.19%, respectively. At the stock level,



the greatest contributors to performance were Amphenol Corp, Tyler Technologies and HEICO, these stocks contributed 0.66%, 0.50% and 0.45%, respectively.

- Amphenol (APH) is a leading manufacturer of connectors, interconnect systems, and cables for a diverse set of end markets. The company reported Q1 results that showed healthy growth across several areas including commercial air, military and auto. The highlight of the quarter, however, was the strength of its IT datacom segment, which saw revenue growth of 28% y/y, on the back of demand for AI applications that require high performance interconnect systems. At the same, some of the end markets that have been softer over the last few guarters, such as mobile networks and broadband, are starting to show signs of improvement and orders and book to bill were both indicative of ongoing strength of the overall business. Lastly, it just closed one of the largest deals in its history with Carlisle Interconnect Technologies, which should be very complementary and synergistic to the business.
- Tyler Technologies, Inc. (TYL) is a leading provider of integrated • software and technology solutions for the public sector, empowering local, state, and federal government entities to create smarter, safer, and stronger communities. The stock was up over 9% around its Q1 earnings report in late April as the company delivered better than expected results including its 13<sup>th</sup> consecutive guarter of 20%+ SaaS growth as its cloud transition continues to sustain traction. Margin performance was impressive as the company saw benefits from the cloud transition in terms of version consolidation and cloud optimization of products. Additionally, management noted robust public sector demand with leading sales activity indicators remaining elevated and growing momentum with cross-sell activity. The company continues to execute well as it moves toward its "Tyler 2030" vision, which calls for improving growth and margin expansion, therefore we continue to view Tyler as a high conviction holding.
- HEICO (HEI) is an industrial company operating under two segments; its Flight Support Group (FSG) segment

manufactures commercial aerospace aftermarket components and its Electronic Technologies Group (ETG) which makes electronic equipment for a diverse set of industrial markets. The stock performed well due to the continued strength of its aerospace segment that is benefiting from robust passenger traffic, as well as market share gains. Importantly, the company acquired Wencor last fall, which was one of its main competitors in FSG. In ETG, it experienced a long-awaited recovery in its defense applications business and with that came strong margin expansion. The company continues to execute well and while it's still early, the opportunity to drive revenue synergies with Wencor is very attractive.

Detracting from relative performance at the industry level were consumer discretionary, industrials and real estate; these industries detracted 1.80%, 0.59% and 0.57%, respectively. At the stock level, the greatest detractors from performance were CoStar Group Inc, Pool Corp and Ulta Beauty Inc, these stocks detracted 0.66%, 0.65% and 0.54%, respectively.

• CoStar Group (CSGP) is a leading provider of online real estate marketplaces, information and analytics products, including Apartments.com and Homes.com. Despite the stock being up nearly 9% following the company's Q1 earnings report in late April, concerns increased throughout the quarter as investors became worried about near-term dislocations to the core business from greater focus on the emerging residential strategy, an ongoing CFO search, and the pending Matterport acquisition saw increased regulatory scrutiny. The company did modestly lower its CoStar (core CRE data platform) guidance for the year, now calling for 10% growth vs. prior 11-12% as sales reps have been temporarily redeployed to sell Homes.com memberships. This headwind should be mitigated as the company builds out its dedicated Homes.com salesforce and CoStar reps refocus on core product sales. In mid-June the company appointed Christian Lown as CFO, a well-regarded industry leader who most recently served as CFO at Freddie Mac. Lastly, the pending acquisition of Matterport (a spatial




data company that creates 3D models of real-world spaces to help professionals in a variety of industries) is facing uncertainty due to increased regulatory scrutiny with the companies recently receiving a second request from the FTC. While we continue to believe that CoStar is well positioned longer term given its sizeable competitive moat and its ability to deploy a proven playbook as it builds out the residential business, we are closely monitoring these areas of near-term uncertainty.

- Pool Corporation (POOL) is a leading distributor of pool, ٠ supplies, equipment, chemicals and related products. The main reason for underperformance stems from the elusive recovery of pool construction and remodel activity. The maintenance part of the business, which is ~60% of revenue, is stable, but hasn't been enough to offset declines in these more discretionary areas. Management came into the year with the expectation of seeing pool construction and remodel activity flat to down -10% on a year-over-year basis. Unfortunately, since the last earnings report, trends did not improve in the most important months of the season (May to June), which combined with still weak pool permit data, led management to reset those expectations and now are guiding for these areas to be down 15% to 20% for the year. The company's position and its growth algorithm over the medium term are still unchanged in our opinion, but the post-pandemic hangover and higher rates are making it challenging to time when the trough and eventual recovery will occur.
- Ulta Beauty (ULTA) is the largest specialty beauty retailer in the US and the premier beauty destination for cosmetics, fragrance, skincare products, hair care products, and salon services through its national store footprint, e-commerce operations, and partnership with Target (TGT). Much of the weakness in the stock occurred early in the quarter, when management's commentary at an industry conference in early April highlighted the beauty category moderating faster and to a greater degree than initially anticipated, with management accordingly expecting Q1 comparable sales results to come in at the lower end of prior guidance. This narrative spooked investors and drove the stock down over 20% in the month of April,

underscoring concerns about both a weakening consumer spending backdrop and increasing competitive intensity. The company's Q1 earnings report in late May provided some reassurance with better than feared results though management acknowledged the company continues to focus on its prestige beauty offering to stabilize market share in that category. While promotional activity has increased vs. last year, management noted it continues to remain below pre-pandemic levels. Good momentum in Ulta's loyalty program and ongoing strength in the TGT partnership should help support growth going forward, though we continue to closely monitor the broader health of the consumer as well as market share dynamics in the beauty category.


### Exhibit 9: Market Underappreciates Importance of ROE Over Time



Source: Raymond James, 6/10/24

## 😫 Geneva

### Exhibit 10: Over the Long Term, Higher Quality Factors Outperform



Source: Piper Sandler Cornerstone Macro, 6/18/24

## **Investment Outlook**

Third Quarter 2024

Geneva's forecast of capitalmarkets total returns-12 months forward									
	30-day commercial paper	2-year Treasury note	10-year Treasury note	30-year Treasury note	S&P 500 Index				
12 month return potential*	1.10%	2.40%	3.25%	5.15%	-2.90%				
Level on 6/30/2024	5.34%	4.75%	4.40%	4.56%	5,460				

\*These potential returns are based on the projected yields discussed or presented herein. Actual returns may be more or lesshan projections.

Source: Geneva Capital Management, Bloomberg, as of 6/30/2024

# Performance

### US Small Cap Growth model strategy top contributors and detractors for the quarter ended 6/30/2024

Top Contributors	Strat	egy	Top Detractors	Strategy		
	Ending Weight (%)	Contribution (%)	Top Detractors	Ending Weight (%)	Contribution (%)	
Onto Innovation Inc	4.58	0.93	Kinsale Capital Group Inc	3.42	-1.26	
Globus Medical Inc	2.37	0.51	DoubleVerify Holdings Inc	1.18	-0.96	
Exponent Inc	3.20	0.45	Trex Co Inc	2.54	-0.80	
Ollie's Bargain Outlet Holding	2.20	0.43	SiteOne Landscape Supply Inc	1.74	-0.71	
Perficient Inc	1.59	0.40	Certara Inc	1.71	-0.47	

The holdings identified in this table, in compliance with Geneva policy, do not represent all of the securities purchased, held or sold during the period. To obtain a list showing every holding as a percentage of the portfolio at the end of the most recent publicly available disclosure period, contact (414) 224-6002.

Performance (%)	2Q24	YTD	1 yr	3 yr	5 yr	10 yr
Composite (gross)	-1.01	6.10	10.32	0.24	9.01	11.72
Composite (net)	-1.14	5.83	9.76	-0.29	8.43	11.09
Russell 2000 <sup>®</sup> Growth Index	-2.92	4.44	9.14	-4.86	6.16	7.39

Past performance cannot guarantee future results. Investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principal and fluctuation of value. This information is supplemental to the US Small Cap Growth composite GIPS Report found on pages 21-23 of this document, including information on net returns, additional performance information and important disclosures. Returns for periods greater than one year are annualized. One cannot invest directly in an index.

Information relating to portfolio holdings is based on the model strategy for the composite and may vary for accounts in the strategy due to asset size, client guidelines and other factors. The model strategy reflects the portfolio management style.

Security contribution to performance is measured by using an algorithm that multiplies the daily performance of each security with the previous day's ending weight in the portfolio and is gross of advisory fees. Fixed income securities and certain equity securities, such as private placements and some share classes of equity securities, are excluded. As of 6/30/24 the top 10 portfolio holdings of the US Small Cap Growth Model Strategy are: Onto Innovation Inc (4.58%), Construction Partners Inc (4.19%), Texas Roadhouse Inc (3.63%), RBC Bearings Inc (3.43%), Kinsale Capital Group Inc (3.42%), Exponent Inc (3.20%), AAON Inc (3.18%), ExlService Holdings Inc (3.13%), Descartes Systems Group Inc (3.09%), Novanta Inc (2.78%). There are no assurances that any portfolio currently holds these securities or other securities mentioned. Portfolio holdings are as of the date indicated and are subject to change. This material should not be construed as a recommendation to buy or sell any security.



# Performance

### US Mid Cap Growth model strategy top contributors and detractors for the quarter ended 6/30/2024

Top Contributors	Strat	egy	Top Detractors	Strategy			
Top contributors	Ending Weight (%)	Contribution (%)	Top Detractors	Ending Weight (%)	Contribution (%)		
Amphenol Corp	4.66	0.66	CoStar Group Inc	2.25	-0.66		
Tyler Technologies Inc	3.33	0.50	Pool Corp	2.20	-0.65		
HEICO Corp	2.95	0.45	Ulta Beauty Inc	1.30	-0.54		
Verisk Analytics Inc	3.54	0.44	Repligen Corp	1.19	-0.53		
Monolithic Power Systems Inc	1.39	0.24	Global Payments Inc	1.44	-0.53		

The holdings identified in this table, in compliance with Geneva policy, do not represent all of the securities purchased, held or sold during the period. To obtain a list showing every holding as a percentage of the portfolio at the end of the most recent publicly available disclosure period, contact (414) 224-6002.

Performance (%)	2Q24	YTD	1 yr	3 yr	5 yr	10 yr
Composite (gross)	-5.26	2.68	12.39	0.89	10.13	10.92
Composite (net)	-5.38	2.43	11.85	0.42	9.61	10.42
Russell Midcap <sup>®</sup> Growth Index	-3.21	5.98	15.05	-0.08	9.92	10.51

Past performance cannot guarantee future results. Investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principal and fluctuation of value. This information is supplemental to the US Mid Cap Growth composite GIPS Report found on pages 24-26 of this document, including information on net returns, additional performance information and important disclosures. Returns for periods greater than one year are annualized. One cannot invest directly in an index.

Information relating to portfolio holdings is based on the model strategy for the composite and may vary for accounts in the strategy due to asset size, client guidelines and other factors. The model strategy reflects the portfolio management style.

Security contribution to performance is measured by using an algorithm that multiplies the daily performance of each security with the previous day's ending weight in the portfolio and is gross of advisory fees. Fixed income securities and certain equity securities, such as private placements and some share classes of equity securities, are excluded. As of 6/30/24 the top 10 portfolio holdings of the US Mid Cap Growth Model Strategy are: Amphenol Corp (4.66%), Copart Inc (4.47%), O'Reilly Automotive Inc (4.47%), Axon Enterprise Inc (4.41%), Gartner Inc (3.80%), Verisk Analytics Inc (3.54%), Tyler Technologies Inc (3.33%), Fiserv Inc (3.08%), HEICO Corp (2.95%), Roper Technologies Inc (2.83%). There are no assurances that any portfolio currently holds these securities or other securities mentioned. Portfolio holdings are as of the date indicated and are subject to change. This material should not be construed as a recommendation to buy or sell any security.



**US Small Cap Growth** 

			Annual Perform	mance Results					3 Year Ex-Post Standard Dev			
Year End	Total Firm Assets USD (millions)	Composite Assets USD (millions)	Number of Accounts	Composite Gross	Composite Net	Russell 2000 <sup>®</sup> Growth	<sup>9</sup> Russell 2000 <sup>®</sup>	Composite Dispersion	Composite	Russell 2000 <sup>®</sup> Growth	<sup>9</sup> Russell 2000	
2023	5,842	3,352	60	19.45%	18.84%	18.66%	16.93%	0.1%	19.73%	21.79%	21.11%	
2022	5,027	2,774	58	-23.85%	-24.27%	-26.36%	-20.44%	0.1%	23.14%	26.20%	26.02%	
2021	6,998	3,567	56	13.29%	12.69%	2.83%	14.82%	0.1%	19.42%	23.07%	23.35%	
2020	6,679	3,469	52	34.03%	33.29%	34.63%	19.96%	0.2%	22.22%	25.10%	25.27%	
2019	5,274	2,537	49	29.63%	28.90%	28.48%	25.53%	0.1%	15.62%	16.37%	15.71%	
2018	4,577	2,006	44	0.01%	-0.55%	-9.31%	-11.01%	0.1%	15.43%	16.46%	15.79%	
2017	5,202	2,007	37	23.48%	22.79%	22.17%	14.65%	0.2%	11.87%	14.59%	13.91%	
2016	5,327	1,982	47	11.84%	11.17%	11.32%	21.31%	0.1%	13.08%	16.67%	15.76%	
2015	4,682	1,101	36	11.66%	10.93%	-1.38%	-4.41%	0.2%	12.33%	14.95%	13.96%	
2014	4,892	882	37	-1.77%	-2.41%	5.60%	4.89%	0.1%	11.40%	13.82%	13.12%	
2013	6,695	1,011	36	45.18%	44.41%	43.30%	38.82%	0.4%	13.70%	17.27%	16.45%	
2012	3,774	288	21	17.76%	17.15%	14.59%	16.35%	0.2%	17.39%	20.72%	20.20%	
2011	2,609	173	14	1.44%	0.95%	-2.91%	-4.18%	0.2%	22.15%	24.31%	24.99%	
2010	1,872	110	8	38.02%	37.39%	29.09%	26.85%	0.4%				
2009	1,393	45	6	23.75%	23.22%	34.47%	27.17%	N.A.*				
2008	979	28	Five or fewer	-33.18%	-33.49%	-38.54%	-33.79%	N.A.*	-			
2007	1,579	9	Five or fewer	14.15%	13.69%	7.05%	-1.57%	N.A.*	-			
2006	1,355	6	Five or fewer	6.31%	5.90%	13.35%	18.37%	N.A.*		3 Year Ex-Post	t	
2005	1,073	5	Five or fewer	15.85%	15.39%	4.15%	4.55%	N.A.*	S	tandard Deviati		
2004	815	4	Five or fewer	22.72%	22.22%	14.31%	18.33%	N.A.*		Not required		
2003	693	3	Five or fewer	33.43%	32.89%	48.54%	47.25%	N.A.*		Prior to 2011		
2002	531	2	Five or fewer	-14.40%	-14.71%	-30.26%	-20.48%	N.A.*				
2001	537	1	Five or fewer	4.15%	3.67%	-9.23%	2.49%	N.A.*	-			
2000	514	1	Five or fewer	2.77%	2.30%	-22.43%	-3.02%	N.A.*	-			
1999	470	1	Five or fewer	7.50%	7.13%	43.09%	21.26%	N.A.*				
	*N.A.	- Information	is not statistical	ly meaningful	due to an insu	fficient numbe	r of portfolios in	the composite	e for the entire	e year.		

**US Small Cap Growth** 

### **Compliance Statement**

Geneva Capital Management claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®) and has prepared and presented this report in compliance with the GIPS® standards. Geneva Capital Management has been independently verified for the periods January 1, 1993 through December 31, 2023.

A firm that claims compliance with the GIPS standards must establish policies and procedures for complying with all the applicable requirements of the GIPS standards. Verification provides assurance on whether the firm's policies and procedures related to composite and pooled fund maintenance, as well as the calculation, presentation, and distribution of performance, have been designed in compliance with the GIPS standards and have been implemented on a firm-wide basis. The US Small Cap Growth composite has had a performance examination for the periods January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2023. The verification and performance examination reports are available upon request.

### The Firm

Geneva Capital Management LLC is a registered investment adviser. On October 1, 2014 Henderson Global Investors Inc. acquired Geneva Capital Management LLC, and subsequently merged with Janus Capital Group Inc. on May 30, 2017 to form Janus Henderson Group plc. After this merger, Geneva Capital Management was a wholly owned subsidiary of Janus Henderson Group plc. On March 17, 2020 certain members of Geneva's management team, along with a minority partner, Estancia Capital Management, LLC, acquired Geneva from Janus Henderson Group plc, making Geneva Capital Management an independent entity.

### **Composite Description**

The US Small Cap Growth composite contains fully discretionary equity accounts invested in approximately 50-60 small-capitalization growth securities whose market capitalization ranges generally fall between \$500 million to \$3 billion at the time of purchase. Securities are selected using a "bottom-up" fundamental analysis of the company and supplemented by "top-down" considerations of economic conditions. Prior to September 30, 2015, the composite was named Geneva Smallcap Composite. There is no minimum account size for this composite. Prior to January 1, 2006, the minimum account size was \$500,000. From January 1, 2004 through December 31, 2005, accounts were removed from the composite if they fell more than 20% below the minimum account size. Beginning July 1, 2008, composite policy requires the temporary removal of any portfolio incurring a client initiated significant cash inflow or outflow of 30% portfolio assets or greater. The temporary removal of such an account occurs at the beginning of the month in which the significant cash flow occurs and the account re-enters the composite the last day of the month in which the cash flow takes place.

### **Composite Benchmark**

For comparison purposes, the US Small Cap Growth composite is measured against the primary index Russell 2000<sup>®</sup> Growth Index and secondary Russell 2000<sup>®</sup> Index. The Russell 2000<sup>®</sup> Growth Index measures the performance of the small-cap growth segment of the U.S. equity universe. It includes those Russell 2000<sup>®</sup> Index companies with higher price-to-value ratios and higher forecasted growth values (Source: http://www.ftserussell.com). The Russell 2000<sup>®</sup> Index measures the performance of the small-cap segment of the U.S. equity universe. The Russell 2000<sup>®</sup> is a subset of the Russell 3000<sup>®</sup> Index representing approximately 10% of the total market capitalization of that index. It includes approximately 2000 of the smallest securities based on a combination of their market cap and current index membership (Source: http://www.ftserussell.com). Performance results in presentations prior to January 1, 2002 were measured against the S&P<sup>®</sup> 600 Index. From January 1, 2002 through January 1, 2008 performance results were primarily measured against the Russell 2000<sup>®</sup> Index. The benchmark was changed to be more representative of the composite strategy and style. Information regarding the S&P 600<sup>®</sup> Index is available upon request.

### **Fee Information**

The annual fee schedule is 100 bps (1.00%) on the first \$50 million, 90 bps (0.90%) on \$50 to \$100 million, and 80 bps (0.80%) on the balance over \$100 million. Fees are billed or charged to the account in arrears, at one quarter of the annual rate, on a quarterly basis - or as applicable based on the average month-end values for each of the three months comprising a quarter. Actual investment advisory fees incurred by clients will vary.

**US Small Cap Growth** 

### **Basis of Returns**

Results are based on fully discretionary accounts under management, including those accounts no longer with the firm. Composite returns are net of transaction costs and reflect the reinvestment of dividends and other earnings. Gross composite returns do not reflect the deduction of investment advisory fees. Net composite returns reflect the deduction of actual investment advisory fees. Actual advisory fees vary among clients invested in the strategy. Actual performance results may differ from composite returns depending on the size of the account, investment guidelines and/or restrictions, fee schedules and other factors. Prior to January 1, 2000, net returns were calculated using the highest fee per the fee schedule in the ADV Part 2 which was 1.0%. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

### **Composite Dispersion**

The annual composite dispersion presented is an asset-weighted standard deviation calculated for the accounts in the composite the entire year. Composite Dispersion is based on gross of fees performance.

### **3-Year Ex-Post Standard Deviation**

The three year annualized standard deviation measures the variability of the composite gross return and the benchmark return over the preceding 36-month period.

### **GIPS Policies and Procedures**

The Firm maintains a complete list of composite descriptions, which is available upon request. Policies for valuing investments, calculating performance, and preparing GIPS Reports are available upon request.

### **Composite Creation Date**

The US Small Cap Growth composite creation date is January 1, 1999.

### **Composite Inception Date**

The US Small Cap Growth composite inception date is December 31, 1998.

### **Composite Currency**

The U.S. Dollar is the currency used to express performance.

### **GIPS Registered Trademark**

GIPS® is a registered trademark of CFA Institute. CFA Institute does not endorse or promote this organization, nor does it warrant the accuracy or quality of the content contained herein.

### Important Information

All investments involve risk, including possible loss of principal. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. The value of an investment and the income from it can fall as well as rise and you may not get back the amount originally invested. Nothing in this document is intended to or should be construed as advice. This document is not a recommendation to sell or purchase any investment.

### **Portfolio Management Changes**

Effective July 10, 2017; Michelle Picard retired and left Geneva Capital Management and Jose Munoz was promoted from Senior Analyst to Portfolio Manager. Effective October 22, 2018; Amy Croen retired and left Geneva Capital Management.



**US Mid Cap Growth** 

			Annual Perfor	mance Results					3 Year Ex-	Post Standard	Deviation
Year End	Total Firm Assets USD	Composite Assets USD	Number of Accounts	Composite Gross	Composite Net	Russell Midcap®	Russell Midcap <sup>®</sup>	Composite Dispersion	Composite	Russell Midcap®	Russell Midcap®
	(millions)	(millions)	4 5	24.040/	24.240/	Growth	47.220/	0.2%	24.050/	Growth	40.440/
2023	5,842	891	45	24.84%	24.24%	25.87%	17.23%	0.2%	21.05%	21.06%	19.11%
2022	5,027	883	51	-27.92%	-28.26%	-26.72%	-17.32%	0.1%	24.60%	24.53%	23.62%
2021	6,998	1,477	57	25.04%	24.48%	12.73%	22.58%	0.2%	19.05%	20.19%	20.55%
2020	6,679	1,518	60	32.44%	31.81%	35.59%	17.10%	0.5%	20.36%	21.45%	21.82%
2019	5,274	1,411	61	31.57%	30.98%	35.47%	30.54%	0.1%	12.79%	13.88%	12.89%
2018	4,577	1,698	63	-1.92%	-2.35%	-4.75%	-9.06%	0.2%	12.59%	12.82%	11.98%
2017	5,202	2,377	67	24.38%	23.82%	25.27%	18.52%	0.1%	10.61%	10.89%	10.36%
2016	5,327	2,299	108	3.08%	2.61%	7.33%	13.80%	0.2%	11.41%	12.18%	11.55%
2015	4,682	2,807	111	4.54%	4.08%	-0.20%	-2.44%	0.1%	11.13%	11.31%	10.85%
2014	4,892	3,247	128	5.90%	5.44%	11.90%	13.22%	0.2%	10.56%	10.87%	10.14%
2013	6,695	4,896	190	32.00%	31.46%	35.74%	34.76%	0.1%	13.69%	14.62%	14.03%
2012	3,774	2,860	168	11.51%	11.03%	15.81%	17.28%	0.2%	16.62%	17.91%	17.20%
2011	2,609	1,958	140	4.19%	3.73%	-1.65%	-1.55%	0.2%	18.86%	20.82%	21.55%
2010	1,872	1,297	119	30.83%	30.25%	26.38%	25.48%	0.4%	_		
2009	1,393	928	96	36.89%	36.28%	46.29%	40.48%	0.4%	_		
2008	979	618	96	-35.54%	-35.86%	-44.32%	-41.46%	0.3%			
2007	1,579	1,061	92	17.00%	16.50%	11.43%	5.60%	0.2%			
2006	1,355	794	89	5.62%	5.15%	10.66%	15.26%	0.2%	-		
2005	1,073	581	70	15.84%	15.39%	12.10%	12.65%	0.4%			
2004	815	399	38	20.92%	20.47%	15.48%	20.22%	0.2%			
2003	693	340	34	26.55%	26.10%	42.71%	40.06%	0.3%		3 Year Ex-Post	
2002	531	229	24	-14.05%	-14.36%	-27.41%	-16.19%	0.4%	-	andard Deviati	
2001	537	244	24	-3.84%	-4.18%	-20.15%	-5.62%	0.3%	-	Not required	
2000	514	212	16	13.36%	13.00%	-11.75%	8.25%	0.6%	-	Prior to 2011	
1999	470	286	56	14.29%	13.19%	51.29%	18.23%	4.1%	-		
1998	380	206	53	28.77%	27.56%	17.86%	10.09%	1.9%	-		
1997	259	135	36	25.03%	23.85%	22.54%	29.01%	2.7%	-		
1996	214	90	34	27.40%	26.20%	17.48%	19.00%	1.7%	-		
1995	195	73	32	28.40%	27.20%	33.98%	34.45%	2.9%	-		
1994	133	53	28	-0.50%	-1.50%	-2.16%	-2.09%	1.3%			
1993	120	28	26	5.02%	3.99%	11.19%	14.30%	1.6%	-		
	120	20	20	5.0270	3.3370		1.00/0	2.070			

## GIPS Report US Mid Cap Growth

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### **Compliance Statement**

Geneva Capital Management claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®) and has prepared and presented this report in compliance with the GIPS® standards. Geneva Capital Management has been independently verified for the periods January 1, 1993 through December 31, 2023.

A firm that claims compliance with the GIPS standards must establish policies and procedures for complying with all the applicable requirements of the GIPS standards. Verification provides assurance on whether the firm's policies and procedures related to composite and pooled fund maintenance, as well as the calculation, presentation, and distribution of performance, have been designed in compliance with the GIPS standards and have been implemented on a firm-wide basis. The US Mid Cap Growth composite has had a performance examination for the periods January 1, 1993 through December 31, 2023. The verification and performance examination reports are available upon request.

### The Firm

Geneva Capital Management LLC is a registered investment adviser. On October 1, 2014 Henderson Global Investors Inc. acquired Geneva Capital Management LLC, and subsequently merged with Janus Capital Group Inc. on May 30, 2017 to form Janus Henderson Group plc. After this merger, Geneva Capital Management was a wholly owned subsidiary of Janus Henderson Group plc. On March 17, 2020 certain members of Geneva's management team, along with a minority partner, Estancia Capital Management, LLC, acquired Geneva from Janus Henderson Group plc, making Geneva Capital Management an independent entity.

### **Composite Description**

The US Mid Cap Growth composite contains fully discretionary equity accounts invested in approximately 50-60 mid-capitalization growth securities whose market capitalization ranges generally fall between \$2 billion to \$15 billion at the time of purchase. Securities are selected using a "bottom-up" fundamental analysis of the company and supplemented by "top-down" considerations of economic conditions. Prior to January 1, 2006, the composite was named Geneva Growth. Between January 1, 2006 and September 30, 2015 the composite was named Geneva Midcap Growth Composite. The minimum account size for this composite is \$500,000. As of January 1, 2004 accounts are removed annually if they fall more than 20% below the minimum account size. Beginning January 1, 2006, composite policy requires the temporary removal of any portfolio incurring a client initiated significant cash inflow or outflow of 30% portfolio assets or greater. The temporary removal of such an account occurs at the beginning of the month in which the significant cash flow occurs and the account re-enters the composite the last day of the month in which the cash flow takes place. Prior to January 1, 2000, balanced portfolio segments were included in this composite and performance reflects required total segment plus cash returns using a predetermined cash allocation percentage.

### **Composite Benchmark**

For comparison purposes, the US Mid Cap Growth composite is measured against primary index Russell Midcap<sup>®</sup> Growth Index and secondary Russell Midcap<sup>®</sup> Index. The Russell Midcap<sup>®</sup> Growth Index measures the performance of the mid-cap growth segment of the U.S. equity universe. It includes those Russell Midcap<sup>®</sup> Index companies with higher price-to-book ratios and higher forecasted growth values (Source: http://www.ftserussell.com). The Russell Midcap<sup>®</sup> Index measures the performance of the mid-cap segment of the U.S. equity universe. The Russell Midcap<sup>®</sup> is a subset of the Russell 1000<sup>®</sup> Index. It includes approximately 800 of the smallest securities based on a combination of their market cap and current index membership. The Russell Midcap<sup>®</sup> represents approximately 31% of the total market capitalization of the Russell 1000<sup>®</sup> companies (Source: http://www.ftserussell.com). Performance results in presentations prior to January 1, 2002 were measured against the S&P 400<sup>®</sup> Index. From January 1, 2002 through January 1, 2008 performance results were primarily measured against the Russell Midcap<sup>®</sup> Index. The benchmark was changed to be more representative of the composite strategy and style. Information regarding the S&P 400<sup>®</sup> Index is available upon request.

### **Fee Information**

The annual fee schedule for institutional clients is 75 bps (0.75%) on the first \$100 million and 60 bps (0.60%) on the balance over \$100 million. The annual fee schedule for retail clients is 100 bps (1.00%) on the first \$1.5 million, 85 bps (0.85%) on the next \$8.5 million, and 70 bps (0.70%) on the balance over \$10 million. Fees are billed or charged to the account in arrears, at one quarter of the annual rate, on a quarterly basis - or as applicable based on the average month-end values for each of the three months comprising a quarter. Actual investment advisory fees incurred by clients will vary.

## GIPS Report US Mid Cap Growth

#### Basis of Returns

Results are based on fully discretionary accounts under management, including those accounts no longer with the firm. Composite returns are net of transaction costs and reflect the reinvestment of dividends and other earnings. Gross composite returns do not reflect the deduction of investment advisory fees. Net composite returns reflect the deduction of actual investment advisory fees. Actual advisory fees vary among clients invested in the strategy. Actual performance results may differ from composite returns depending on the size of the account, investment guidelines and/or restrictions, fee schedules and other factors. Prior to January 1, 2000, net returns were calculated using the highest fee per the fee schedule in the ADV Part 2 which was 1.0%. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

### **Composite Dispersion**

The annual composite dispersion presented is an asset-weighted standard deviation calculated for the accounts in the composite the entire year. Composite Dispersion is based on gross of fees performance.

#### 3-Year Ex-Post Standard Deviation

The three year annualized standard deviation measures the variability of the composite gross return and the benchmark return over the preceding 36-month period.

### **GIPS Policies and Procedures**

The Firm maintains a complete list of composite descriptions, which is available upon request. Policies for valuing investments, calculating performance, and preparing GIPS Reports are available upon request.

### **Composite Creation Date**

The US Mid Cap Growth composite creation date is January 1, 1988.

### **Composite Inception Date**

The US Mid Cap Growth composite inception date is December 31, 1987.

### **Composite Currency**

The U.S. Dollar is the currency used to express performance.

### **GIPS Registered Trademark**

GIPS® is a registered trademark of CFA Institute. CFA Institute does not endorse or promote this organization, nor does it warrant the accuracy or quality of the content contained herein.

### Important Information

All investments involve risk, including possible loss of principal. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. The value of an investment and the income from it can fall as well as rise and you may not get back the amount originally invested. Nothing in this document is intended to or should be construed as advice. This document is not a recommendation to sell or purchase any investment.

#### **Portfolio Management Changes**

Effective July 10, 2017; Michelle Picard retired and left Geneva Capital Management and Jose Munoz was promoted from Senior Analyst to Portfolio Manager. Effective October 22, 2018; Amy Croen retired and left Geneva Capital Management.



### **Statement of Purpose**

Geneva Capital Management (or "Firm") prepares an Economic and Investment Outlook ("EIO") on a quarterly basis. The purpose of the EIO is to communicate the views and opinions held by the Firm's Investment Team ("the Team") at a particular time regarding current and future economic and market trends. The views expressed in the EIO may change as new information becomes available to the Team. Clients and prospects of the Firm may receive the EIO as a reference for understanding the Firm's intermediate and long-term outlook. This process has been in place since the inception of the Firm.

The EIO includes commentary, charts and graphs that are produced either internally or sourced from outside research organizations. The Firm carefully reviews all external source material used in the EIO and believes the information to be reliable; however, we cannot guarantee the accuracy or completeness of external data. Views expressed in the EIO should not be interpreted as a recommendation to buy or sell a particular security or type of securities and any forward looking views or statements may not come to pass. Current and prospective clients may obtain additional information about the Firm in our Form ADV brochure. A copy is available upon request.

### **Geneva Capital Management**

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Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principal and fluctuation of value.

Geneva does not consider tax implications when making investment decisions, the strategy is generally tax efficient due to Geneva's low turnover rate. Geneva will take specific steps to achieve tax efficiency if directed by the client.

