


Economic and Investment Outlook First Quarter 2025



Economic Outlook

The US economy has had a remarkable run over the past two years with strong growth, full employment, moderating inflation and 20%+ stock market returns. While there are still some concerns under the surface especially in light of the puts and takes that could come with Trump 2.0 starting January 20 (immigration restrictions, potential tariffs, impact of Department of Government Efficiency, etc.), US GDP remains healthy with the latest Q3 estimate showing an increase of 3.1% q/q annualized (slight acceleration from 3.0% in Q2), while for Q4 consensus estimates currently point to +2.3% and the Atlanta Fed GDPNow estimate remains elevated at 2.7% q/q growth (Exhibit 1).

Exhibit 1: GDPNow Estimate Remains Near 3% for Q4-24




Note: GDPNow is not an official GDP metric or estimate from the Atlanta Federal Reserve. Rather it is constructed by aggregating statistical model forecasts of 13 subcomponents that comprise GDP to provide an intra-quarter estimate. Historically, this figure has tended to overstate actual final GDP readings but is still directionally meaningful.

Source: Atlanta Federal Reserve, 1/10/25

The bulk of Q3's GDP growth was driven by consumer spending, as Personal Consumer Expenditures, or PCE, rose 3.7% q/q (the largest increase since Q1-23) and contributed +2.5%. Fixed investment (+0.2%) and government consumption (+0.9%) also were key positive contributors, while net exports and private inventories were headwinds to GDP. Although the outlook for Q4 is a bit more mixed due to the challenges from the large hurricanes in the South and the lingering

impacts of worker strikes, the resilient consumer should continue to drive solid economic growth (Exhibit 2).

Exhibit 2: Consumer Remains Resilient






Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis and Census Bureau, 12/23/24




Even more recent consumer data points continue to support strong and broad-based consumer spending. Early holiday season results (Black Friday spending +3.4% y/y with a skew towards online with brick-andmortar sales only +0.7% vs. e-commerce sales +14.6%; Cyber Monday spending +7.3% y/y) demonstrated that consumers are still willing to spend even amidst the higher interest rate environment. We have written about the depletion of excess savings in prior narratives, but despite that trend and rising auto and credit card delinquencies, US household debt to disposable income remains low compared to global peers like Australia and Canada. Even though there is some bifurcation between high and low-income consumers, the excess savings reduction trend clearly does not tell the whole story as many Americans have built up a solid asset cushion. In addition, over 10,000 baby boomers will turn 65 each day from now until 2030 and being the wealthiest group of retirees in history, they are likely to fuel growth and potentially distort savings rates lower in the aggregate (Exhibit 3).

Exhibit 3: Household Finances in the US Look Solid and Savings Rate Does Not Tell the Whole Story



Source: Statistics Canada, Reserve Bank of Australia and St. Louis Federal Reserve (FRED), 12/23/24




Source: The Federal Reserve, 12/31/24

Part of the continued strength of the consumer can be attributed to wages (average hourly earnings +4.0% y/y in November) now outpacing inflation over the last 12-18 months even though absolute wage gains have decelerated. Inflation has decelerated faster than wages and that has been positive for the broader economy with most areas now normalized. Based on November data, headline CPI rose 0.3% m/m and 2.7% y/y, while core CPI (excludes food and energy) increased 3.3% y/y. This was in line with market expectations and while there was some uptick in inflation in energy and groceries, the good news was around shelter which posted the slowest m/m gains since early 2021. A deceleration in the rising cost of shelter has been a key driver in the inflation picture recently, but outside of that, the Fed's closely watched "super-core CPI" measure (core services ex-home rents) remains elevated with the 3-month rolling average holding steady at an



annualized 4.3% (Exhibit 4). The breadth of inflation pressures across non-shelter components widened in November with the share of the CPI basket growing at >3% annualized rate over the last 3 months rising to 63% from 49% in October. While it is widely expected that shelter inflation should continue to recede as new lower lease rates flow through to CPI rent calculations, the non-housing-related CPI components remain sticky and some indicators like the Cleveland Fed's Inflation Nowcast show core CPI slightly re-accelerating in December.

Exhibit 4: Inflation Decelerating but Still Sticky Above 2%




Source: Bloomberg, 12/31/24

Outside of inflation and consumer spending, the Trump election victory in November has bolstered general business sentiment with hope for

deregulation, tax cuts and a more favorable M&A environment. Specifically, small business optimism within the NFIB survey saw the largest m/m jump in 30 years (Exhibit 5), which typically bodes well for the broader economy as small business accounts for 44% of employment in the US (Exhibit 6). That said, much of the optimism thus far is based on speculation of policy changes to come and it bears monitoring what actually gets delivered, as we know election promises can be difficult to achieve and Trump enters 2025 with less fiscal policy wiggle room, materially higher interest rates and an inability to cut corporate tax rates as meaningfully as he did in 2017.


Exhibit 5: Small Business Optimism Saw Largest M/M Jump in 30 Years Post-Election



Source: NFIB, 11/30/24




Exhibit 6: Small Business Accounts for 44% of Employment in US



Source: Piper Sandler Cornerstone, 12/8/24

Improving business sentiment should be a good sign for employment moving forward as well. Jobs data has remained steady in recent months with jobs growth of 227,000 bouncing back nicely in November and December after negative Hurricane Helene/Milton and Boeing strike headwinds. According to some economists, even backing out the estimated 70,000 jobs rebound from these idiosyncratic events, the payroll increase of 157,000 jobs in November was a touch stronger than October driven by growth in private education and health services and leisure/hospitality, while white collar roles in HR, IT and consulting remain weak (Exhibit 7). Digging a bit deeper, the unemployment rate actually increased from 4.1% to 4.2% in November (returned back to 4.1% in Dec) not due to layoffs, but rather tepid hiring and some Americans dropping out of the labor force (193,000 left in November alone), pushing the participation rate down to 62.5% from 62.6% in October. In addition, the median duration of unemployment rose to 10.5 weeks, which was the highest in nearly 3 years and aligns with the elevation in continuing claims we have seen recently. Overall, there has been some divergence in strong payrolls/employment data and the fall in participation which could be explained by some of the recent weatherbased volatility, but it bears monitoring moving forward to gauge the health of the labor market.

Exhibit 7: Overall Unemployment Remains at 4.1% but White Collar Recession Continues



*Note: Data is from LinkedIn and compares August 2024 to August 2018 hiring levels.

Source: LinkedIn, 11/22/24

The Federal Reserve still believed labor market cooling was a larger risk in their dual mandate, so they continued on their easing path and cut interest rates 25bps in December despite healthy GDP growth and sticky inflation above 2%. That said, Fed Chairman Jay Powell did make it clear that this was a "more difficult" decision (there was one dissenter who argued for no cut) and that a slower pace of cuts in 2025 (only 50bps in the latest forecast) is now the base case. This economic projection update was much more hawkish than the market expected as it had priced in 100bps of cuts. With inflation staying sticky and upside growth risk from the incoming Trump administration, it seems that risk management concerns for the Fed have tilted it toward more patience in



2025. The economic data has not evolved as Fed officials predicted 3 months ago as both inflation and jobs data have moved in ways that support fewer cuts. They expected unemployment would be 4.4% and core PCE inflation would be 2.6%, and today we are running at 4.2% and 2.8%, respectively. As a result, the Fed put forward a more balanced view and even though Powell argued inflation is still moving in the right direction, he said the Fed will enter 2025 with a "more cautious approach," which we think makes sense based on the current data.

There are a couple other areas of the macroeconomic picture that are worth mentioning. First, overall industrial production and manufacturing activity remains weak. December was the 25th month of the last 26 when ISM Manufacturing PMI came in below 50, representing contraction (Exhibit 8). Cass shipments, rail volumes and less-than-truckload tonnage have been in a 23-month downturn. That said, there are some signs of life. The ISM Manufacturing PMI figure actually improved to 49.3 in December which is the highest level since March 2024. In addition, ISM's New Orders, which typically leads the ISM PMI out of contraction by 1-2 months moved back above 50 in November for the first time in 7 months and hit 52.5 in December (highest since May 2022). In November, spot dry van rates were up 4% y/y despite lower fuel rates, which have had a 79% PMI correlation since 2012 when using a threemonth lag. Overall, it is still a mixed bag and despite some greenshoots. a true recovery will require several months in a row of expansionary readings.

Exhibit 8: ISM New Orders Expanding but Overall PMI Still in Contraction





Source: ISM, 1/3/25

In terms of our economic outlook, we are increasing our 2024 Real GDP estimate to 2.5% and nudging up our initial 2025 estimate to 1.7% from 1.4%, which still reflects some moderation and uncertainty as well as potential for some of these recent positive business sentiment indicators to continue. We still believe that even as the Fed continues to cut rates, the lagged impact of easing will take time to bolster economic growth and employment, limiting expansion in the near term. The market had priced 100bps of additional rate cuts before the Fed meeting and has now adjusted down to ~40bps by the end of 2025 (as of 1/8/25), which is slightly more dovish than our expectations as we still think there may only be 0-25bps of cuts. Our forecast is that the Fed is more likely to remain higher for longer as they balance some job market uncertainty with the risk of an inflation relapse (a growing risk in our view due to Trump's potential tariffs driving price increases and stricter immigration stance limiting labor supply). As a result, we are maintaining our headline CPI forecasts of 2.9% for 2024 and 2.5% for 2025, in line with consensus (which has moved up recently post-Fed meeting).

All in, the US economy's resilience in 2024 was impressive and the economy seems to be on track to achieve a soft landing absent some sort of surprising black swan event. While some economic variables continue to improve, we are still closely monitoring unemployment, fiscal policy and the Federal Reserve as we expect some economic softening and uncertainty under a new administration as we enter 2025. We are more bullish on the macroeconomic outlook than we were a year ago due to recent data, but believe some caution is still warranted



considering the high degree of economic and political uncertainty as we start 2025.

Longer Term

Over the last handful of quarters, we have written short thought pieces regarding historical inflation episodes, reshoring/China, Artificial Intelligence, the US labor situation, the federal deficit, US consumer resiliency and US fiscal policy as long-term factors impacting macroeconomic trends. This quarter, we thought it was timely to cover government spending, especially in light of Trump's proposed Department of Government Efficiency, which has caused plenty of news since November.


The United States is currently grappling with a persistent and widening budget deficit, which reached \$1.8 trillion in fiscal year 2024, amounting to 6.4% of GDP. This shortfall was the largest on record outside of the COVID affected FY20/FY21, driven by a combination of rising entitlement spending, increased interest payments on the national debt, and discretionary expenditures. President-elect Trump's creation of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) helmed by Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy offers a potential avenue for addressing this challenge, but its success depends on what is proposed and implemented.

As we have discussed in prior outlooks, the deficit grows when government expenditures exceed revenues. As of 2023, the major drivers of increased expenditures included:

- 1. <u>Entitlement Programs</u>: Social Security (\$1.3 trillion) and Medicare (\$839 billion) expenditures continue to grow as the population ages, placing increasing strain on federal resources.
- 2. Interest on Debt: With rising interest rates, the cost of servicing the national debt has surged (+29% y/y in FY24 to \$1.1 trillion and now >\$3B per day as seen in Exhibit 9), consuming a larger share of federal revenues. Interest is now the second largest federal expenditure after Social Security, surpassing defense and Medicare spending.

3. <u>Defense Spending</u>: While necessary to address heightened geopolitical risks globally, defense expenditures totaled \$805B in 2023 before increasing to nearly \$850B in FY24 as they remain a big piece of federal spending.





Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve (FRED), 1/2/25

Despite strong economic growth in recent years supporting tax receipts (+11% in FY24 to \$4.9 trillion), these revenues have not kept pace with spending, exacerbating the deficit. Policymakers face the dual challenge of fostering economic growth while implementing fiscal policies that ensure long-term sustainability. Deficits are projected to remain high in FY25 and some forecasters see it approaching \$3 trillion by 2034.


President-elect Trump's answer to some of these deficit concerns is DOGE, which aims to streamline federal operations, reduce spending waste, and optimize public sector performance. Its mandate includes conducting audits of federal agencies, identifying redundant programs, and recommending actionable reforms. So far, only a few details are publicly known, but the team will partner with the government's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to drive large-scale cost savings, with



the initiative set to conclude by July 4, 2026. Musk and Ramaswamy originally talked about targeting \$2 trillion of cuts, but have walked that back to closer to \$500 billion as it became clear the larger figure was nearly impossible based on \$2 trillion being larger than the entire discretionary budget (Exhibit 10).

Exhibit 10: Daunting Task for US Department of Government

Efficiency Under Trump



Source: CBO, 12/26/24

Some initial focus areas highlighted by DOGE include driving reductions in federal regulations and mass headcount changes across agencies, ending remote work and targeting unauthorized or unused federal expenditures that could total \$500+ billion. In addition, they have proposed audits of government procurement processes and digital transformation to modernize technology and simplify areas like the tax code.

Efforts to improve government efficiency are not new. Past administrations have launched similar initiatives, with varying degrees of success. Three primary examples stand out. First, President Ronald Reagan launched the Grace Commission in 1982, which was led by 150 private sector leaders and focused on reviewing and recommending

changes to reduce waste. The commission's report highlighted 2,500 opportunities for \$424 billion of cost savings over 3 years, though many recommendations faced resistance and were not fully implemented. Second, President Bill Clinton's "National Performance Review" (later renamed the "Reinventing Government Initiative"), led by Vice President Al Gore, focused on making the federal government "work better and cost less." Rather than bringing in private sector experts, the Clinton administration relied on ~250 civil servants and enabled agencies to generate \$136 billion in savings and eliminate 640,000 pages of internal rules. In total, this initiative achieved some successes, such as streamlining procurement processes and reducing the federal workforce, resulting in cost savings, but some questioned if it truly made government work better as many with specialized skills exited the public sector. Lastly, During President Obama's tenure, the Simpson-Bowles Commission, formally known as the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, was established in 2010 to address the growing national debt and fiscal imbalances. The commission proposed a mix of spending cuts and revenue increases aimed at reducing the deficit by \$4 trillion over the next decade. Although the recommendations garnered bipartisan support among commission members, they faced political resistance and were never fully implemented, highlighting the challenges of achieving consensus on deficit reduction.

These historical efforts underscore both the potential and the challenges of government efficiency initiatives. Success often hinges on sustained political support, effective leadership, and the ability to navigate entrenched bureaucratic resistance.

This new iteration with DOGE has generated a lot of initial hype in terms of its ability to contribute to deficit reduction in several ways, but the magnitude will depend on the true scale and scope of the final reforms. While DOGE may achieve some short-term savings, it is a bigger question around how durable and sustainable some of these savings can be given structural issues like entitlement reform and tax policy are political albatrosses and may be required long-term.



The creation of DOGE represents a proactive step toward addressing the United States' budget deficit. While it is not a panacea, it has the potential to make meaningful contributions to fiscal sustainability if coupled with broader structural reforms. Policymakers must approach this opportunity with a clear vision, a commitment to transparency, and a willingness to make difficult choices. We remain a bit skeptical of the promised outcomes until we start to see concrete action because of the historical track record of government efficiency programs struggling and also the polarization today in American politics that can prevent even common sense policies from moving forward.

Overall, while much of the Department of Government Efficiency initiatives remain speculative, it is clear that the majority of Americans believe something needs to be done to get the US back on a sustainable fiscal path. We are hopeful that under Musk and Ramaswamy's leadership, DOGE focuses on relevant and pragmatic areas of waste reduction rather than broad-sweeping political vendettas, but the outcomes are currently very difficult to handicap. Even if DOGE does a great job finding areas of government inefficiency, it is really just a recommendation engine, so it remains to be seen how much change is actually implemented as a result. So while there is certainly some doubt in our minds about where these changes go, we are optimistic about the underlying state of the US economy, which should be bolstered if government lets market forces work, and continue to espouse Warren Buffett's principle that, "for 240 years, it's been a terrible mistake to bet against America."



Economic Outlook

First Quarter 2025

Outlook	2021	2022	2023	2024E	2025E
Real GDP	5.7%	2.5%	2.9%	2.5%*	1.7%
Inflation (Headline CPI) Year over Year (YoY) change	7.0%	6.5%	3.4%	2.9%*	2.5%
Operating Earnings (S&P 500 Index)	43.6%	5.4%	0.9%	8.2%	8.9%
Annual housing starts (in thousands)	1,600	1,553	1,420	1,350*	1,400
Capex (Gross private domestic investment, fixed investment– non-residential)	7.4%	7.0%	4.5%	2.0%*	1.0%
U.S. auto sales, domestically produced vehicles (in millions)	10.1	10.5	12.4	12.8	13.0
10-year Treasury (yearend)	1.51%	3.87%	3.88%	4.57%	4.00%
30-year Treasury (yearend)	1.90%	3.96%	4.03%	4.78%	4.25%

Source: *2024 items and all 2025 data estimates are Geneva estimates. Historical data, Bloomberg data and U.S. Federal Resere data as of 12/31/2024.



Investment Outlook

2024 marked the fifth year of the last six where broad US equity indices, as well as growth indices, have generated double-digit returns. Using the S&P 500 as a proxy, 2019-2021 generated returns of 190%, followed by a decline of 19% in 2022 and an aggregate return of 58% in 2023-2024. What is notable about the last two years is how narrow the market has become with the index performance increasingly driven by fewer names (Exhibit 1). To wit, the equal-weighted S&P 500 has underperformed the value-weighted indices by 28% over the last two years, exhibiting the weakest breadth in history as only 27% of stocks within the index outperformed. Growth stocks have clearly outperformed with the Russell 1000 Growth exceeding the Russell 1000 Value by 63% over the last two years, which is the largest divergence in history, even surpassing the 1998-1999 dotcom bubble. We have also experienced the most challenging year for small caps relative to large caps since 1998, continuing large caps' nearly 15-year run of outperformance. As we have written in previous outlooks, this divergence in performance is getting long in the tooth (Exhibit 2) and we are often asked if we expect this to reverse. While it is impossible to forecast future market levels with precision, there are several reasons why we expect this reversion to play out sooner rather than later.


Exhibit 1: Market Concentration Continues to Increase



*Note: Data is citing the Bloomberg 500 index which can vary slightly from the official S&P 500 index constituents.

Source: Bloomberg, 1/10/25

Exhibit 2: Market Cycles Tend to Alternate, and the Current Large
Cap Era Is Long in the Tooth



*Note: Ken French Data Library using value-weighted, returns averaged monthly for companies in lowest market cap deciles 6-10 divided by highest market cap deciles 1-5. Returns are annualized for each period (12/31/1931-3/31/2024)

Source: Active Edge, March 2024

Eight years have passed since President Trump won the general election in 2016, and while there are some similarities in the rhetoric post-election in 2024 vs. 2016, there are also stark differences in terms of the economic reality. Unlike President Trump's first term, we are still recovering from the worst inflationary spike in 40 years, which has led to a rotating slowdown across sectors with healthcare and industrials being the most pronounced. The table below (Exhibit 3) shows that in 2016, the economy was in expansionary territory, consumer confidence was elevated, the Fed Funds rate was only 50bps (and rising) and the S&P 500 valuation was much lower relative to today's levels and also trading at a notable discount to small caps vs. the current premium. All these dynamics are different today. This matters because small cap



stocks tend to do better as PMIs recover, consumer sentiment improves, and interest rates decrease.


Exhibit 3: 2016 vs. 2024 Economic and Valuation Metrics

	2016	2024
ISM Manufacturing PMIs	52	48
Fed Funds Rate	0.5%	4.5%
Consumer Sentiment	98	74
S&P 500 P/E Multiple	18.5x	26.0x
Russell 2000 P/E Multiple	23.5x	23.4x

Source: FactSet and Bloomberg, 12/20/24

Importantly, stock prices ultimately follow profits. If we see an improvement in the above economic indicators, coupled with lower rates, we believe small cap profits will grow faster than their large cap counterparts. This should also lead to multiple expansion of small caps relative to large caps, as long as tariff and immigration uncertainty does not impact capital expenditures in the same way that we saw in 2018-2019.

Exhibit 4: Sources of EPS Growth for S&P 500



S&P 500 Y/Y Share of EPS Growth	2024	Average 2001-2023
Margin Expansion	8.1%	2.7%
Revenue Growth	1.6%	4.2%
Share Count Change	-0.8%	0.3%
Total EPS	8.9%	7.5%

*Note: 2024 EPS growth in bottom table is based on consensus analyst estimates

Sources: Bloomberg, 1/10/25 and JPM Asset Management, 10/31/24

Interestingly, during Trump's first term, the S&P 500 returned over 63% with earnings growth of 21% (Exhibit 4), while small caps returned 45% with earnings growth of nearly 40%. This large cap outperformance of nearly 2,000bps is mostly explained through multiple expansion, and with a current market multiple of 26x for the S&P 500, as well as in analyzing historic multiple peaks mostly associated with bubbles (late 1990's for example), there does not appear to be much room for large cap multiples to sustainably expand a significant degree during this forthcoming term. Earnings will be an important determinant of market performance and historically, small caps tend to have faster earnings growth. In addition, current forecasts for 2025 small cap earnings predict faster growth than their large cap counterparts, which suggests small caps are less expensive than currently observed (Exhibit 5). That said, given the current correction we are experiencing with small cap and mid cap growth equities down 9-10% from their late 2024 peak, we feel a reasonable return expectation is to retest those previous highs, providing a more normal, historical type of return for 2025. Our current valuation model estimates ~9% S&P 500 earnings growth in 2025 which combined with the current 22x NTM P/E multiple, translates to a projected level of \$5,940 which is +1% from the 12/31/24 level and +3% from the levels as of this writing on 1/10/25.



Exhibit 5: Small Cap Valuations Still Attractive Small got cheaper vs. large; value also cheaper down cap

_		Percentile Rank	
Size vs. Large	Today	Last Month	Sep-20
Small	17	10	12
Mid	10	9	18
Value vs. Growth	Today	Last Month	Sep-20
Small	28	25	2
Mid	28	37	5
Large	39	38	3
Source: FactSet; FTSE Russell; Jefferies			

Small expected to top large by Q2 of '25 in terms of earnings growth

	Earning	gs Growth (In %)	
Quarter/Year	Small	Mid	Large
1Q25P	5.0	7.4	12.2
2Q25P	12.1	9.8	10.3
3Q25P	21.5	16.6	13.4
4Q25P	25.7	19.5	16.9
2025P	15.9	12.2	13.5
Source: FactSet; Standard & Po	oor's; Jefferies		

Ouarter/Vear	Sales	Growth (In %)	
Quarter/Year	Small	Mid	Large
1Q25P	3.0	3.2	5.1
2Q25P	3.6	4.6	5.3
3Q25P	4.6	5.8	5.6
4Q25P	5.6	5.8	6.6
2025P	4.2	5.0	5.6

Source: FactSet; Standard & Poor's; Jefferies

*Note: "Percentile Rank" is a methodology where Jefferies takes 5 valuation factors and ranks the score. The lower the number, the cheaper the group is, and this provides a historical perspective on where market valuations are currently.

Source: Jefferies, 12/3/24

This is certainly one of the more opaque economic and market forecasting environments we have experienced. After recent strong returns, it would be understandable to expect a forthcoming correction (despite historical record showing decent performance as seen in Exhibit 6), and indeed as we have seen in the first 10 days of 2025, we appear to be in the midst of small one. However, the market is clearly excited about the new administration and some of the appointments,

plans, and policies they are pursuing. Most notably, the creation of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) to rein in government spending has given the bond markets a modicum of confidence that the United States will not follow the path to becoming a banana republic. As more information becomes available, we will continue to adjust our forecasts accordingly, but what will not change is our adherence to our process and philosophy which has served us well for 38 years and driven resiliency in the face of challenging environments.

Exhibit 6: S&P +20% Over 2 Years – Historical Record Is Bullish S&P 500 Returns After Back-to-Back 20% Returns (1950 - Current)

Years That Gained 20%	Year 1	Year 2	Year after Back-to-Back 20% Gains
1950 and 1951	30.8%	23.7%	18.2%
1954 and 1955	52.6%	32.6%	7.4%
1975 and 1976	37.0%	23.8%	-7.0%
1982 and 1983	20.4%	22.3%	6.1%
1995 and 1996	37.2%	22.7%	33.1%
1996 and 1997	22.7%	33.1%	28.3%
1997 and 1998	33.1%	28.3%	20.9%
1998 and 1999	28.3%	20.9%	-9.0%
2023 and 2024	26.1%	23.3%	?
	Average Yea	ar 3 Return	12.3%
	Median Yea	ır 3 Return	12.8%
	High	ner	6
	Tot	al	8
	% Higher	in Year 3	75.0%

Source: NYU, 11/24/24

Small-Cap Growth Commentary

For the quarter ended December 31, 2024, the Geneva Small Cap Growth strategy composite returned 0.01% (gross of fees, -0.11% net of fees) versus 1.70% for the Russell 2000® Growth Index, underperforming by 1.69% (gross of fees, -1.81% net of fees). The factor headwinds were difficult this quarter as low quality outperformed high quality by 4.09% within the broader US equity universe. Within the Russell 2000 Growth Index we experienced significant quality headwinds; the highest beta companies were up 11.9%, nonearners were up 5.8% and companies with a share price of less than \$5 per share were up 20.6%, all of which points to a very low-quality market.



Contributing to relative performance at the industry level were healthcare, industrials, and energy; these industries contributed 1.77%, 0.30% and 0.15%, respectively. At the stock level, the greatest contributors to performance were Construction Partners Inc, EXLService Holdings Inc, and Vertex Inc; these stocks contributed 1.24%, 0.57%, and 0.41%, respectively.

- Construction Partners (ROAD) Construction Partners is a vertically-integrated asphalt paving company with a leading position in the Southeast region. Shares were up nearly 27% in the quarter behind better-than-expected FQ4-24 results in light of headwinds from hurricanes, but more importantly based on its acquisition of Lone Star Paving, which represents the company's entry into the attractive infrastructure market of TX. Importantly, Lone Star Paving is a high-performing asset with a strong historical track record of growth and margins higher than ROAD's existing margins. With M&A execution remaining a catalyst and infrastructure demand trends still strong in ROAD's core Southeast markets, we continue to have high conviction in the company.
- EXLService Holdings (EXLS) EXL Service is a global analytics and digital solutions company serving industries including insurance, healthcare, banking and financial services, among others. Shares were up 16% in the guarter driven by the company's better-than-expected Q3 earnings report in late October, which included double digit growth across verticals and management's commentary pointed to sustainable growth and margin upside longer-term. The demand environment remains strong across end markets and geographies, and investors continue to better appreciate opportunities around Generative AI as the company builds out capabilities including data management and proprietary industry-specific Al models. Additionally, the company continues to see traction in large deals (>\$25M total contract value), which we believe underscores the value proposition EXL provides to its clients, and we continue to have high conviction in the outlook.
- Vertex (VERX) Vertex is a leading provider of indirect tax automation solutions, supporting a global customer base across indirect tax types such as sales tax and VAT, among

others. The company delivered another strong beat across revenue and adj. EBITDA in Q3, while Q4 guidance also came in ahead of consensus (particularly for profitability, when adjusting for dynamics from a recent acquisition). Shares were up 39% in the quarter behind the strong report. Underlying demand for VERX's offerings is solid, with a multi-year ERP cloud migration supercycle and e-invoicing opportunity lending further visibility to future growth, while management's execution has been strong from a growth and profitability standpoint as well. As such, we see a favorable long-term outlook for VERX.

Detracting from relative performance at the industry level were technology, consumer discretionary, and consumer staples; these industries detracted 2.37%, 0.98% and 0.45%, respectively. At the stock level, the greatest detractors from performance were Onto Innovation Inc, Exponent Inc, and ePlus Inc; these stocks detracted 0.80%, 0.79% and 0.43%, respectively.

- Onto Innovation Inc (ONTO) Onto Innovation is a leader in the development and manufacturing of process control equipment and software for semiconductor manufacturers. Q3 results and Q4 guidance were roughly in line with consensus and ONTO expressed a confident tone as it relates to 2025, but the stock was down in the quarter as it digested prior year-to-date strength and saw some moderation in its AI-related business. The outlook for its AI-related business appears healthy though and various other end markets are in recovery mode too, so when combined with solid execution from management, we continue to have conviction in ONTO's long-term opportunity.
- Exponent (EXPO) Exponent is a niche engineering and scientific consulting firm with multidisciplinary teams of engineers, scientists, physicians, and other experts helping solve complex problems facing companies and communities. The company delivered mixed Q3 results and while activity within previously challenged areas like consumer electronics rebounded to healthy levels in the quarter, the company experienced ongoing headwinds in the chemicals end market (~10% of revenue) as well as tough YoY comparisons following



strong growth in reactive services in the prior year period. Despite near-term challenges, EXPO delivered improved utilization and margin expansion, and management expects improving trends going forward, but we believe sentiment has been weak as investors weigh the potential impact of deregulatory actions by the new administration, particularly on EXPO's proactive services business. Historically, changes in administration have had minimal impact on EXPO's business and we remain confident the company can achieve management's targeted HSD-LDD growth with margin expansion over the long-term, supported by opportunities across end markets.

• ePlus (PLUS) – ePlus is a technology solutions provider specializing in IT products, professional services, and financing solutions. In their most recent quarter, results fell short of expectations, with revenue declining 13% y/y due to a 22% drop in product revenue driven by tough comps, macro IT spending pressures, and an accounting shift with more revenue recorded on a net basis. While the technology segment faced headwinds, gross margin expanded, supported by a 44% increase in services revenue and strength in the financing segment. However, the reduction in FY revenue guidance to flat growth (from +3-6% previously) highlights challenges with visibility in the current IT environment, raising concerns about the company's ability to navigate near-term demand volatility effectively.

Mid-Cap Growth Commentary

For the quarter ended December 31, 2024, the Geneva Mid Cap Growth strategy composite returned 1.63% (gross of fees, 1.52% net of fees) versus 8.14% for the Russell Midcap® Growth Index, underperforming by 6.51% (gross of fees, -6.62% net of fees). The factor headwinds were difficult this quarter as low quality outperformed high quality by 4.09% within the broader US equity universe. Within the Russell Midcap Growth Index, we experienced significant quality headwinds; the highest beta companies were up 18.9% and the most expensive stocks in the index were up 17.8%, all of which points to a very low-quality market.

Contributing to relative performance at the industry level were industrials, consumer staples, and basic materials; these industries contributed 1.24%, 0.13% and 0.08%, respectively. At the stock level, the greatest contributors to performance were Axon Enterprise Inc, HubSpot Inc, and Fiserv Inc, these stocks contributed 2.16%, 0.54% and 0.51%, respectively.

- Axon Enterprise (AXON) Axon is a leading provider of solutions including the Taser, body/fleet cameras, and cloud-based software to law enforcement and adjacent markets with the mission of protecting life and enabling a fair and effective justice system. Shares were up 49% in the guarter amid another beatand-raise earnings report, with 2024 guidance being raised by 2% for revenue and 9% for adj. EBITDA. Momentum in the business is robust across all geographic, end market, and product areas as AXON delivers strong product-market fit and is increasingly being utilized as a broader platform vs. individual solutions. Shares also benefited from excitement around AXON's new AI Era Plan bundle that will differentiate it in the marketplace as it harnesses the power of AI for its targeted industries. Our conviction in AXON remains high given a multitude of drivers to sustain 20%+ annual revenue growth and further margin expansion.
- HubSpot (HUBS) HubSpot is a leading front office software provider (customer relationship management, marketing, and service) in the SMB and mid-market. The company reported solid Q3 results, with revenue and billings both growing 20% y/y, driven by strong performance in large deals/multi-hub wins and interest in their AI products. Margins improved by over 200bps y/y, reflecting progress in operational efficiencies, and the company increased full-year guidance for both revenue and earnings. In the near-term, the company should be well set up to execute in 2025 with potential upside to numbers if the selling backdrop improves, and over the long-term they remain well positioned for durable growth as their innovation and platform approach drives success.
- Fiserv Inc (FI) Fiserv is a leading global provider of payments and financial services technology solutions. The company reported strong good O3 results, with adjusted revenue growing



710% y/y and EPS exceeding expectations, driven by robust demand for its payments and financial solutions. The Merchant Solutions segment saw very strong growth, with Clover contributed 28% growth and VAS penetration up to 21%. The Financials Solutions segment grew 5% and the new Cash Flow Central product is off to a strong start. Key segments, such as digital payments and merchant services, showed nice growth, with continued momentum in client acquisitions and cross-selling opportunities. Despite macroeconomic uncertainties, Fiserv raised its full-year guidance, reflecting confidence in its ability to maintain growth and enhance profitability through operational efficiencies and strategic investments.

Detracting from relative performance at the industry level were technology, financials, and healthcare; these industries detracted 4.93%, 1.01% and 0.81%, respectively. At the stock level, the greatest detractors from performance were Monolithic Power Systems Inc, Advanced Drainage Systems Inc, and IDEXX Laboratories Inc; these stocks detracted 0.66%, 0.62% and 0.44%, respectively.

Monolithic Power Systems (MPWR) – Monolithic Power Systems designs and manufactures high-performance analog and mixed-signal semiconductors for power management applications in a variety of industries, including automotive, consumer electronics. industrial. and The stock underperformed due to a negative report from Edgewater Research, which reported that Nvidia had canceled half of a material portion of MPWR's backlog and there would be limited or no allocation for certain products, potentially tied to unresolved product failures related to power consumption issues. Despite management's efforts to resolve technical issues and maintain confidence in the market, these concerns raised substantial downside risks, investor sentiment will

- remain challenged until there's more clarity about its market share in enterprise data, which has been the fastest growing segment in recent quarters. particularly for the enterprise data segment, causing investor sentiment to remain weak.
- Advanced Drainage Systems (WMS) Advanced Drainage Systems is a leading manufacturer of water management products, specializing in stormwater and wastewater solutions, including pipes and related products for residential, non-residential, and agricultural markets. The company missed expectations for FQ2-25, and full-year guidance was reduced, reflecting weather headwinds, a choppy non-residential demand environment, and rising raw material costs. Many of the challenges appear non-recurring or cyclical, so while we are monitoring these dynamics, management appears to be executing well and with a long-term mindset. We continue to view the company's long-term opportunity as attractive and are looking to gain more conviction in near-term end market dynamics.
- IDEXX Laboratories (IDXX) IDEXX Laboratories is a leading provider of diagnostic and information technology solutions for veterinary, livestock, and poultry markets. The company continues to face broader macro headwinds as clinical vet visits remain below historical averages, which is something we continue to monitor in the face of a new pain management drug in the market. This resulted in a downward adjustment to full year revenue and EPS as a shift in trends remains fleeting, but operationally the margin expansion story remains strong despite some of the top line weakness. All-in, IDXX remains one of the best positioned companies in animal health, and while visit trends remain subdued (weighing on sentiment), we believe that this is more transient than structural and the company is set up for success over the long term.

Performance

US Small Cap Growth model strategy top contributors and detractors for the guarter ended 12/31/2024

Tan Cantuibutana	Strategy		
Top Contributors	Ending Weight (%)	Contribution (%)	
Construction Partners Inc	4.63	1.24	
ExlService Holdings Inc	4.05	0.57	
Vertex Inc	1.48	0.41	
Globus Medical Inc	3.05	0.38	
AAON Inc	3.93	0.32	

Ton Detractors	Strategy			
Top Detractors	Ending Weight (%)	Contribution (%)		
Onto Innovation Inc	3.48	-0.80		
Exponent Inc	2.75	-0.79		
ePlus Inc	1.36	-0.43		
Novanta Inc	2.65	-0.42		
Bright Horizons Family Solutions	1.33	-0.35		

The holdings identified in this table, in compliance with Geneva policy, do not represent all of the securities purchased, held or sold during the period. To obtain a list showing every holding as a percentage of the portfolio at the end of the most recent publicly available disclosure period, contact (414) 224-6002.

Performance (%)	4Q24	YTD	1 yr	3 yr	5 yr	10 yr
Composite (gross)	0.01	15.83	15.83	1.76	9.85	12.33
Composite (net)	-0.11	15.26	15.26	1.23	9.27	11.70
Russell 2000 [®] Growth Index	1.70	15.15	15.15	0.21	6.85	8.09

Past performance cannot guarantee future results. Investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principal and fluctuation of value. This information is supplemental to the US Small Cap Growth composite GIPS Report found on pages 19-21 of this document, including information on net returns, additional performance information and important disclosures. Returns for periods greater than one year are annualized. One cannot invest directly in an index.

Information relating to portfolio holdings is based on the model strategy for the composite and may vary for accounts in the strategy due to asset size, client guidelines and other factors. The model strategy reflects the portfolio management style.

Security contribution to performance is measured by using an algorithm that multiplies the daily performance of each security with the previous day's ending weight in the portfolio and is gross of advisory fees. Fixed income securities and certain equity securities, such as private placements and some share classes of equity securities, are excluded. As of 12/31/24 the top 10 portfolio holdings of the US Small Cap Growth Model Strategy are: Construction Partners Inc (4.63%), ExIService Holdings Inc (4.05%), AAON Inc (3.93%), Kinsale Capital Group Inc (3.78%), Texas Roadhouse Inc (3.50%), RBC Bearings Inc (3.48%), Onto Innovation Inc (3.48%), Descartes Systems Group Inc (3.32%), Globus Medical Inc (3.05%), Exponent Inc (2.75%). There are no assurances that any portfolio currently holds these securities or other securities mentioned. Portfolio holdings are as of the date indicated and are subject to change. This material should not be construed as a recommendation to buy or sell any security.



Performance

US Mid Cap Growth model strategy top contributors and detractors for the guarter ended 12/31/2024

Torr Constillant and	Strategy		
Top Contributors	Ending Weight (%)	Contribution (%)	
Axon Enterprise Inc	4.64	2.16	
HubSpot Inc	2.30	0.54	
Fiserv Inc	3.91	0.51	
Copart Inc	4.05	0.35	
Raymond James Financial Inc	1.33	0.29	

Too Detroctors	Strategy		
Top Detractors	Ending Weight (%) Contribution		
Monolithic Power Systems Inc	1.52	-0.66	
Advanced Drainage Systems Inc	1.96	-0.62	
IDEXX Laboratories Inc	1.93	-0.44	
STERIS PLC	2.34	-0.41	
Pool Corp	2.24	-0.22	

The holdings identified in this table, in compliance with Geneva policy, do not represent all of the securities purchased, held or sold during the period. To obtain a list showing every holding as a percentage of the portfolio at the end of the most recent publicly available disclosure period, contact (414) 224-6002.

Performance (%)	4Q24	YTD	1 yr	3 yr	5 yr	10 yr
Composite (gross)	1.63	11.48	11.48	0.11	10.68	11.13
Composite (net)	1.52	10.96	10.96	-0.37	10.16	10.62
Russell Midcap [®] Growth Index	8.14	22.10	22.10	4.04	11.47	11.54

Past performance cannot guarantee future results. Investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principal and fluctuation of value. This information is supplemental to the US Mid Cap Growth composite GIPS Report found on pages 22-24 of this document, including information on net returns, additional performance information and important disclosures. Returns for periods greater than one year are annualized. One cannot invest directly in an index.

Information relating to portfolio holdings is based on the model strategy for the composite and may vary for accounts in the strategy due to asset size, client guidelines and other factors. The model strategy reflects the portfolio management style.

Security contribution to performance is measured by using an algorithm that multiplies the daily performance of each security with the previous day's ending weight in the portfolio and is gross of advisory fees. Fixed income securities and certain equity securities, such as private placements and some share classes of equity securities, are excluded. As of 12/31/24 the top 10 portfolio holdings of the US Mid Cap Growth Model Strategy are: Axon Enterprise Inc (4.64%), Amphenol Corp (4.42%), O'Reilly Automotive Inc (4.32%), Copart Inc (4.05%), Fiserv Inc (3.91%), Gartner Inc (3.78%), Tyler Technologies Inc (3.52%), Verisk Analytics Inc (3.33%), HEICO Corp (3.15%), Keysight Technologies Inc (2.87%). There are no assurances that any portfolio currently holds these securities or other securities mentioned. Portfolio holdings are as of the date indicated and are subject to change. This material should not be construed as a recommendation to buy or sell any security.



US Small Cap Growth

		Annual Performance Results							3 Year Ex-Post Standard Deviation		
Year End	Total Firm Assets USD (millions)	Composite Assets USD (millions)	Number of Accounts	Composite Gross	Composite Net	Russell 2000® Growth	Russell 2000®	Composite Dispersion	Composite	Russell 2000® Growth	Russell 2000
2023	5,842	3,352	60	19.45%	18.84%	18.66%	16.93%	0.1%	19.73%	21.79%	21.11%
2022	5,027	2,774	58	-23.85%	-24.27%	-26.36%	-20.44%	0.1%	23.14%	26.20%	26.02%
2021	6,998	3,567	56	13.29%	12.69%	2.83%	14.82%	0.1%	19.42%	23.07%	23.35%
2020	6,679	3,469	52	34.03%	33.29%	34.63%	19.96%	0.2%	22.22%	25.10%	25.27%
2019	5,274	2,537	49	29.63%	28.90%	28.48%	25.53%	0.1%	15.62%	16.37%	15.71%
2018	4,577	2,006	44	0.01%	-0.55%	-9.31%	-11.01%	0.1%	15.43%	16.46%	15.79%
2017	5,202	2,007	37	23.48%	22.79%	22.17%	14.65%	0.2%	11.87%	14.59%	13.91%
2016	5,327	1,982	47	11.84%	11.17%	11.32%	21.31%	0.1%	13.08%	16.67%	15.76%
2015	4,682	1,101	36	11.66%	10.93%	-1.38%	-4.41%	0.2%	12.33%	14.95%	13.96%
2014	4,892	882	37	-1.77%	-2.41%	5.60%	4.89%	0.1%	11.40%	13.82%	13.12%
2013	6,695	1,011	36	45.18%	44.41%	43.30%	38.82%	0.4%	13.70%	17.27%	16.45%
2012	3,774	288	21	17.76%	17.15%	14.59%	16.35%	0.2%	17.39%	20.72%	20.20%
2011	2,609	173	14	1.44%	0.95%	-2.91%	-4.18%	0.2%	22.15%	24.31%	24.99%
2010	1,872	110	8	38.02%	37.39%	29.09%	26.85%	0.4%			
2009	1,393	45	6	23.75%	23.22%	34.47%	27.17%	N.A.*			
2008	979	28	Five or fewer	-33.18%	-33.49%	-38.54%	-33.79%	N.A.*	-		
2007	1,579	9	Five or fewer	14.15%	13.69%	7.05%	-1.57%	N.A.*	-		
2006	1,355	6	Five or fewer	6.31%	5.90%	13.35%	18.37%	N.A.*	3 Year Ex-Post Standard Deviation		
2005	1,073	5	Five or fewer	15.85%	15.39%	4.15%	4.55%	N.A.*			
2004	815	4	Five or fewer	22.72%	22.22%	14.31%	18.33%	N.A.*	-	Not required	
2003	693	3	Five or fewer	33.43%	32.89%	48.54%	47.25%	N.A.*	-	Prior to 2011	
2002	531	2	Five or fewer	-14.40%	-14.71%	-30.26%	-20.48%	N.A.*	-		
2001	537	1	Five or fewer	4.15%	3.67%	-9.23%	2.49%	N.A.*	-		
2000	514	1	Five or fewer	2.77%	2.30%	-22.43%	-3.02%	N.A.*			
1999	470	1	Five or fewer	7.50%	7.13%	43.09%	21.26%	N.A.*	-		

^{*}N.A. - Information is not statistically meaningful due to an insufficient number of portfolios in the composite for the entire year.



US Small Cap Growth

Compliance Statement

Geneva Capital Management claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®) and has prepared and presented this report in compliance with the GIPS® standards. Geneva Capital Management has been independently verified for the periods January 1, 1993 through December 31, 2023.

A firm that claims compliance with the GIPS standards must establish policies and procedures for complying with all the applicable requirements of the GIPS standards. Verification provides assurance on whether the firm's policies and procedures related to composite and pooled fund maintenance, as well as the calculation, presentation, and distribution of performance, have been designed in compliance with the GIPS standards and have been implemented on a firm-wide basis. The US Small Cap Growth composite has had a performance examination for the periods January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2023. The verification and performance examination reports are available upon request.

The Firm

Geneva Capital Management LLC is a registered investment adviser. On October 1, 2014 Henderson Global Investors Inc. acquired Geneva Capital Management LLC, and subsequently merged with Janus Capital Group Inc. on May 30, 2017 to form Janus Henderson Group plc. After this merger, Geneva Capital Management was a wholly owned subsidiary of Janus Henderson Group plc. On March 17, 2020 certain members of Geneva's management team, along with a minority partner, Estancia Capital Management, LLC, acquired Geneva from Janus Henderson Group plc, making Geneva Capital Management an independent entity.

Composite Description

The US Small Cap Growth composite contains fully discretionary equity accounts invested in approximately 50-60 small-capitalization growth securities whose market capitalization ranges generally fall between \$500 million to \$3 billion at the time of purchase. Securities are selected using a "bottom-up" fundamental analysis of the company and supplemented by "top-down" considerations of economic conditions. Prior to September 30, 2015, the composite was named Geneva Smallcap Composite. There is no minimum account size for this composite. Prior to January 1, 2006, the minimum account size was \$500,000. From January 1, 2004 through December 31, 2005, accounts were removed from the composite if they fell more than 20% below the minimum account size. Beginning July 1, 2008, composite policy requires the temporary removal of any portfolio incurring a client initiated significant cash inflow or outflow of 30% portfolio assets or greater. The temporary removal of such an account occurs at the beginning of the month in which the significant cash flow occurs and the account re-enters the composite the last day of the month in which the cash flow takes place.

Composite Benchmark

For comparison purposes, the US Small Cap Growth composite is measured against the primary index Russell 2000® Growth Index and secondary Russell 2000® Index. The Russell 2000® Growth Index measures the performance of the small-cap growth segment of the U.S. equity universe. It includes those Russell 2000® Index companies with higher price-to-value ratios and higher forecasted growth values (Source: http://www.ftserussell.com). The Russell 2000® Index measures the performance of the small-cap segment of the U.S. equity universe. The Russell 2000® is a subset of the Russell 3000® Index representing approximately 10% of the total market capitalization of that index. It includes approximately 2000 of the smallest securities based on a combination of their market cap and current index membership (Source: http://www.ftserussell.com). Performance results in presentations prior to January 1, 2002 were measured against the S&P® 600 Index. From January 1, 2002 through January 1, 2008 performance results were primarily measured against the Russell 2000® Index. The benchmark was changed to be more representative of the composite strategy and style. Information regarding the S&P 600® Index is available upon request.

Fee Information

The annual fee schedule is 100 bps (1.00%) on the first \$50 million, 90 bps (0.90%) on \$50 to \$100 million, and 80 bps (0.80%) on the balance over \$100 million. Fees are billed or charged to the account in arrears, at one quarter of the annual rate, on a quarterly basis - or as applicable based on the average month-end values for each of the three months comprising a quarter. Actual investment advisory fees incurred by clients will vary.



US Small Cap Growth

Basis of Returns

Results are based on fully discretionary accounts under management, including those accounts no longer with the firm. Composite returns are net of transaction costs and reflect the reinvestment of dividends and other earnings. Gross composite returns do not reflect the deduction of investment advisory fees. Net composite returns reflect the deduction of actual investment advisory fees. Actual advisory fees vary among clients invested in the strategy. Actual performance results may differ from composite returns depending on the size of the account, investment guidelines and/or restrictions, fee schedules and other factors. Prior to January 1, 2000, net returns were calculated using the highest fee per the fee schedule in the ADV Part 2 which was 1.0%. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

Composite Dispersion

The annual composite dispersion presented is an asset-weighted standard deviation calculated for the accounts in the composite the entire year. Composite Dispersion is based on gross of fees performance.

3-Year Ex-Post Standard Deviation

The three year annualized standard deviation measures the variability of the composite gross return and the benchmark return over the preceding 36-month period.

GIPS Policies and Procedures

The Firm maintains a complete list of composite descriptions, which is available upon request. Policies for valuing investments, calculating performance, and preparing GIPS Reports are available upon request.

Composite Creation Date

The US Small Cap Growth composite creation date is January 1, 1999.

Composite Inception Date

The US Small Cap Growth composite inception date is December 31, 1998.

Composite Currency

The U.S. Dollar is the currency used to express performance.

GIPS Registered Trademark

GIPS® is a registered trademark of CFA Institute. CFA Institute does not endorse or promote this organization, nor does it warrant the accuracy or quality of the content contained herein.

Important Information

All investments involve risk, including possible loss of principal. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. The value of an investment and the income from it can fall as well as rise and you may not get back the amount originally invested. Nothing in this document is intended to or should be construed as advice. This document is not a recommendation to sell or purchase any investment.

Portfolio Management Changes

Effective July 10, 2017; Michelle Picard retired and left Geneva Capital Management and Jose Munoz was promoted from Senior Analyst to Portfolio Manager.

Effective October 22, 2018; Amy Croen retired and left Geneva Capital Management.

Effective September 30, 2024; William A. Priebe, stepped down from his role as co-Portfolio Manager for the US Small Cap Growth strategy.



US Mid Cap Growth

		Annual Performance Results							3 Year Ex-Post Standard Deviation		
Year End	Total Firm Assets USD (millions)	Composite Assets USD (millions)	Number of Accounts	Composite Gross	Composite Net	Russell Midcap [®] Growth	Russell Midcap®	Composite Dispersion	Composite	Russell Midcap® Growth	Russell Midcap [©]
2023	5,842	891	45	24.84%	24.24%	25.87%	17.23%	0.2%	21.05%	21.06%	19.11%
2022	5,027	883	51	-27.92%	-28.26%	-26.72%	-17.32%	0.1%	24.60%	24.53%	23.62%
2021	6,998	1,477	57	25.04%	24.48%	12.73%	22.58%	0.2%	19.05%	20.19%	20.55%
2020	6,679	1,518	60	32.44%	31.81%	35.59%	17.10%	0.5%	20.36%	21.45%	21.82%
2019	5,274	1,411	61	31.57%	30.98%	35.47%	30.54%	0.1%	12.79%	13.88%	12.89%
2018	4,577	1,698	63	-1.92%	-2.35%	-4.75%	-9.06%	0.2%	12.59%	12.82%	11.98%
2017	5,202	2,377	67	24.38%	23.82%	25.27%	18.52%	0.1%	10.61%	10.89%	10.36%
2016	5,327	2,299	108	3.08%	2.61%	7.33%	13.80%	0.2%	11.41%	12.18%	11.55%
2015	4,682	2,807	111	4.54%	4.08%	-0.20%	-2.44%	0.1%	11.13%	11.31%	10.85%
2014	4,892	3,247	128	5.90%	5.44%	11.90%	13.22%	0.2%	10.56%	10.87%	10.14%
2013	6,695	4,896	190	32.00%	31.46%	35.74%	34.76%	0.1%	13.69%	14.62%	14.03%
2012	3,774	2,860	168	11.51%	11.03%	15.81%	17.28%	0.2%	16.62%	17.91%	17.20%
2011	2,609	1,958	140	4.19%	3.73%	-1.65%	-1.55%	0.2%	18.86%	20.82%	21.55%
2010	1,872	1,297	119	30.83%	30.25%	26.38%	25.48%	0.4%			
2009	1,393	928	96	36.89%	36.28%	46.29%	40.48%	0.4%	_		
2008	979	618	96	-35.54%	-35.86%	-44.32%	-41.46%	0.3%	_		
2007	1,579	1,061	92	17.00%	16.50%	11.43%	5.60%	0.2%	_		
2006	1,355	794	89	5.62%	5.15%	10.66%	15.26%	0.2%	_		
2005	1,073	581	70	15.84%	15.39%	12.10%	12.65%	0.4%	_		
2004	815	399	38	20.92%	20.47%	15.48%	20.22%	0.2%	_		
2003	693	340	34	26.55%	26.10%	42.71%	40.06%	0.3%	_	3 Year Ex-Post	
2002	531	229	24	-14.05%	-14.36%	-27.41%	-16.19%	0.4%	Standard Deviation		
2001	537	244	24	-3.84%	-4.18%	-20.15%	-5.62%	0.3%	_	Not required	
2000	514	212	16	13.36%	13.00%	-11.75%	8.25%	0.6%	_	Prior to 2011	
1999	470	286	56	14.29%	13.19%	51.29%	18.23%	4.1%	_		
1998	380	206	53	28.77%	27.56%	17.86%	10.09%	1.9%			
1997	259	135	36	25.03%	23.85%	22.54%	29.01%	2.7%	_		
1996	214	90	34	27.40%	26.20%	17.48%	19.00%	1.7%	_		
1995	195	73	32	28.40%	27.20%	33.98%	34.45%	2.9%	_		
1994	133	53	28	-0.50%	-1.50%	-2.16%	-2.09%	1.3%			
1993	120	28	26	5.02%	3.99%	11.19%	14.30%	1.6%	_		

US Mid Cap Growth

Compliance Statement

Geneva Capital Management claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®) and has prepared and presented this report in compliance with the GIPS® standards. Geneva Capital Management has been independently verified for the periods January 1, 1993 through December 31, 2023.

A firm that claims compliance with the GIPS standards must establish policies and procedures for complying with all the applicable requirements of the GIPS standards. Verification provides assurance on whether the firm's policies and procedures related to composite and pooled fund maintenance, as well as the calculation, presentation, and distribution of performance, have been designed in compliance with the GIPS standards and have been implemented on a firm-wide basis. The US Mid Cap Growth composite has had a performance examination for the periods January 1, 1993 through December 31, 2023. The verification and performance examination reports are available upon request.

The Firm

Geneva Capital Management LLC is a registered investment adviser. On October 1, 2014 Henderson Global Investors Inc. acquired Geneva Capital Management LLC, and subsequently merged with Janus Capital Group Inc. on May 30, 2017 to form Janus Henderson Group plc. After this merger, Geneva Capital Management was a wholly owned subsidiary of Janus Henderson Group plc. On March 17, 2020 certain members of Geneva's management team, along with a minority partner, Estancia Capital Management, LLC, acquired Geneva from Janus Henderson Group plc, making Geneva Capital Management an independent entity.

Composite Description

The US Mid Cap Growth composite contains fully discretionary equity accounts invested in approximately 50-60 mid-capitalization growth securities whose market capitalization ranges generally fall between \$2 billion to \$15 billion at the time of purchase. Securities are selected using a "bottom-up" fundamental analysis of the company and supplemented by "top-down" considerations of economic conditions. Prior to January 1, 2006, the composite was named Geneva Growth. Between January 1, 2006 and September 30, 2015 the composite was named Geneva Midcap Growth Composite. The minimum account size for this composite is \$500,000. As of January 1, 2004 accounts are removed annually if they fall more than 20% below the minimum account size. Beginning January 1, 2006, composite policy requires the temporary removal of any portfolio incurring a client initiated significant cash inflow or outflow of 30% portfolio assets or greater. The temporary removal of such an account occurs at the beginning of the month in which the significant cash flow occurs and the account re-enters the composite the last day of the month in which the cash flow takes place. Prior to January 1, 2000, balanced portfolio segments were included in this composite and performance reflects required total segment plus cash returns using a predetermined cash allocation percentage.

Composite Benchmark

For comparison purposes, the US Mid Cap Growth composite is measured against primary index Russell Midcap® Growth Index and secondary Russell Midcap® Index. The Russell Midcap® Growth Index measures the performance of the mid-cap growth segment of the U.S. equity universe. It includes those Russell Midcap® Index companies with higher price-to-book ratios and higher forecasted growth values (Source: http://www.ftserussell.com). The Russell Midcap® Index measures the performance of the mid-cap segment of the U.S. equity universe. The Russell Midcap® is a subset of the Russell 1000® Index. It includes approximately 800 of the smallest securities based on a combination of their market cap and current index membership. The Russell Midcap® represents approximately 31% of the total market capitalization of the Russell 1000® companies (Source: http://www.ftserussell.com). Performance results in presentations prior to January 1, 2002 were measured against the S&P 400® Index. From January 1, 2002 through January 1, 2008 performance results were primarily measured against the Russell Midcap® Index. The benchmark was changed to be more representative of the composite strategy and style. Information regarding the S&P 400® Index is available upon request.

Fee Information

The annual fee schedule for institutional clients is 75 bps (0.75%) on the first \$100 million and 60 bps (0.60%) on the balance over \$100 million. The annual fee schedule for retail clients is 100 bps (1.00%) on the first \$1.5 million, 85 bps (0.85%) on the next \$8.5 million, and 70 bps (0.70%) on the balance over \$10 million. Fees are billed or charged to the account in arrears, at one quarter of the annual rate, on a quarterly basis - or as applicable based on the average month-end values for each of the three months comprising a quarter. Actual investment advisory fees incurred by clients will vary.



US Mid Cap Growth

Basis of Returns

Results are based on fully discretionary accounts under management, including those accounts no longer with the firm. Composite returns are net of transaction costs and reflect the reinvestment of dividends and other earnings. Gross composite returns do not reflect the deduction of investment advisory fees. Net composite returns reflect the deduction of actual investment advisory fees. Actual advisory fees vary among clients invested in the strategy. Actual performance results may differ from composite returns depending on the size of the account, investment guidelines and/or restrictions, fee schedules and other factors. Prior to January 1, 2000, net returns were calculated using the highest fee per the fee schedule in the ADV Part 2 which was 1.0%. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

Composite Dispersion

The annual composite dispersion presented is an asset-weighted standard deviation calculated for the accounts in the composite the entire year. Composite Dispersion is based on gross of fees performance.

3-Year Ex-Post Standard Deviation

The three year annualized standard deviation measures the variability of the composite gross return and the benchmark return over the preceding 36-month period.

GIPS Policies and Procedures

The Firm maintains a complete list of composite descriptions, which is available upon request. Policies for valuing investments, calculating performance, and preparing GIPS Reports are available upon request.

Composite Creation Date

The US Mid Cap Growth composite creation date is January 1, 1988.

Composite Inception Date

The US Mid Cap Growth composite inception date is December 31, 1987.

Composite Currency

The U.S. Dollar is the currency used to express performance.

GIPS Registered Trademark

GIPS® is a registered trademark of CFA Institute. CFA Institute does not endorse or promote this organization, nor does it warrant the accuracy or quality of the content contained herein.

Important Information

All investments involve risk, including possible loss of principal. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. The value of an investment and the income from it can fall as well as rise and you may not get back the amount originally invested. Nothing in this document is intended to or should be construed as advice. This document is not a recommendation to sell or purchase any investment.

Portfolio Management Changes

Effective July 10, 2017; Michelle Picard retired and left Geneva Capital Management and Jose Munoz was promoted from Senior Analyst to Portfolio Manager.

Effective October 22, 2018; Amy Croen retired and left Geneva Capital Management.

Effective September 30, 2024; William A. Priebe, stepped down from his role as co-Portfolio Manager for the US Mid Cap Growth strategy.



Economic and Investment Outlook

Statement of Purpose

Geneva Capital Management (or "Firm") prepares an Economic and Investment Outlook ("EIO") on a quarterly basis. The purpose of the EIO is to communicate the views and opinions held by the Firm's Investment Team ("the Team") at a particular time regarding current and future economic and market trends. The views expressed in the EIO may change as new information becomes available to the Team. Clients and prospects of the Firm may receive the EIO as a reference for understanding the Firm's intermediate and long-term outlook. This process has been in place since the inception of the Firm.

The EIO includes commentary, charts and graphs that are produced either internally or sourced from outside research organizations. The Firm carefully reviews all external source material used in the EIO and believes the information to be reliable; however, we cannot guarantee the accuracy or completeness of external data. Views expressed in the EIO should not be interpreted as a recommendation to buy or sell a particular security or type of securities and any forward looking views or statements may not come to pass. Current and prospective clients may obtain additional information about the Firm in our Form ADV brochure. A copy is available upon request.

Geneva Capital Management

411 E. Wisconsin Avenue Suite 2320 Milwaukee, WI 53202 Telephone: (414) 224-6002 Fax: (414) 224-9503

www.genevacap.com

The opinions and views expressed are as of 12/31/24 and are subject to change without notice. They are for information purposes only and should not be used or construed as an offer to sell, a solicitation of an offer to buy, or a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any security, investment strategy or market sector. No forecasts can be guaranteed. Opinions and examples are meant as an illustration of broader themes and are not an indication of trading intent. It is not intended to indicate or imply that any illustration/example mentioned is now or was ever held in any portfolio. There is no guarantee that the information supplied is accurate, complete, or timely, nor are there any warranties with regards to the results obtained from its use.

Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principal and fluctuation of value.

Geneva does not consider tax implications when making investment decisions, the strategy is generally tax efficient due to Geneva's low turnover rate. Geneva will take specific steps to achieve tax efficiency if directed by the client.

